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Interpreting Tax Treaties
Rebecca M. Kysar*
ABSTRACT: The circumstances, if any, that permit non-uniform, or
differentiated, treaty interpretation are difficult to define. Generally, a
differentiated approachstands in tension with the Vienna Convention's rules
of interpretation,which apply a methodology based on plain meaning to all
treaties. Yet courts, states, and scholars widely accept the notion that some
treaties warrantspecialinterpretiverules. Thusfar, however, efforts tojustify
differentiated treaty interpretationon the grounds of subject matter or treaty
purpose have proven inadequate. A more promising avenue is the
examination of the objective characteristicsshared within a treaty type. One
such characteristic,I argue, is the treaty's degree of completeness. Specifically,
all else being equal, standalone instruments call for less reliance upon
extrinsicmaterials; interstitialinstruments demand more.
This Article argues that such instruments should not be viewed as complete;
consequently, reference to plain meaning or even the treaty parties' mutual
intent is often incoherent. Specifically, I contend that tax treaties are
jurisdictionaloverlays to the parties'tax systems and substantially rely upon
domestic law. Tax treatiesalso are not heavily negotiated and insteadborrow
from concepts that are embedded in model treaties, domestic law, and other
internationalinstruments. The highly complex nature of tax law and the
factual situations to which it applies, the connection between revenue
collection and state sovereignty, and the necessity to combat tax abuse
retrospectively further explain the interstitialnature of treaties. Courts are
thusjustified in relying upon extrinsic, and at times unilateral, materials in
the interpretationof tax treaties.
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INTRODUCTION

The international law of treaty interpretation, as codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention"), prescribes
general rules of interpretation, based on a plain meaning approach, that
apply uniformly to all treaties.' Yet courts, states, and scholars seem to agree
that some treaties warrant special interpretive rules., Theorizing this
differentiated approach to treaty interpretation, however, remains elusive.
Explanations based on treaty subject matter or purpose fail to satisfy>. Instead,
examination of the objective features shared within a treaty category provides
a more promising avenue forjustifying specialized interpretive methods. One
such characteristic is the treaty's degree of completeness, or its degree of
specificity and operationality. Specifically, all else being equal, standalone
instruments call for less reliance upon extrinsic materials; interstitial
instruments demand more.
Applying this insight to the income tax treaty context,4 such instruments
should not be viewed as complete; accordingly, reference to plain meaning or
even the treaty makers' mutual intent is often incoherent. Specifically,
because tax treaties function to limit the taxing reach of treaty countries
rather than prescribe substantive rules, they are closely intertwined with
domestic law. Indeed, tax treaties explicitly state that domestic law provides
the meaning of any undefined term. Gaps are intentionally left open by treaty
drafters due to the complexity of the tax system and the close connection
between fiscal policy and sovereignty.5
i. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into forceJan. 27, 198o) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
2.
See Julian Arato, Accounting for Difference in Treaty Interpretation over Time, in
INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 205, 205-12 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds., 2015).
3. Id.
4. Note that my analysis is limited to double income tax treaties rather than other types of
tax treaties and agreements, such as estate and gift tax treaties or tax information exchange
agreements. My analysis also does not apply to treaties that have ancillary tax effects or contain
isolated tax provisions. I limit my thesis to the jurisdictional elements of double tax treaties
relating to income, which comprise the backbone of the treaty, rather than those aspects that
have substantive, operative effects-specifically, nondiscrimination, exchange of information,
and mutual agreement provisions. Although I focus on American sources and case law, my
general conclusion-that liberal use of extrinsic sources is appropriate in the interpretation of
tax treaties-is applicable to other legal cultures.
5. Treaty-based gap-filling mechanisms exist; however, these are incomplete. For instance,
article 3(2) of the Model Treaty prescribes that domestic law steps in to provides definitions for
undefined terms "unless the context otherwise requires." U.S. MODEL INCOME TAx CONVENTION
OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 3(2) (U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY 2oo6), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstrty/modeloo6.pdf. Gap-filling may nonetheless be necessary when the domestic definitions
themselves contain vague terms, as is often the case, or to determine if "the context otherwise
requires." Id. Article 2 1 attempts to close jurisdictional gaps by providing that types of income
not dealt with by specific treaty provisions be taxed only by the country of the taxpayer's
residence. Id. art. 21 (1). Nonetheless, extrinsic resources may still need to be consulted to
determine how to categorize the income at issue.
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Tax treaties are also not heavily negotiated. They strongly resemble one
another and refer to concepts that are embedded in the model treaties,
domestic laws, as well as other international instruments. Moreover, the
necessity of combatting tax abuse retrospectively reduces the utility of the
treaty's text and also mandates continuous involvement by the executive
branch in interpreting the treaty. Accordingly, discerning the intent of the
parties or plain meaning should not be the only goal of tax treaty
interpretation. In cases of ambiguity, domestic law and other extrinsic sources
thus fill the gaps in the language of the tax treaty. It would therefore be a
mistake to dismiss these materials when, in fact, the nature of tax treaties
makes reference to them inevitable.
It could be argued that application of sources outside of the treaty
process may, at times, produce double taxation, against which tax treaties are
purported to guard. This danger, however, is low. Typically, only one country
is interpreting the treaty on any given issue. Treaties themselves also provide
further protection against double taxation through mutual agreement
procedures and binding arbitration clauses, and the domestic laws of
countries have mechanisms, like foreign tax credits, that protect against
double taxation. It is also unclear whether a plain meaning approach would
produce less variation in interpretations. Additionally, a loose ordering of
interpretive sources, as well as certain interpretive presumptions that I
propose, could ameliorate this danger.
Looking to extrinsic sources best reflects the realities of the international
taxing system. A non-formalist methodology also guards against tax abuse and
assists in modernizing international agreements to reflect changing
technologies and economies. Indeed, recent projects undertaken by both the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") and
the United States to update the existing treaty network reinforce the need for
flexibility in the interpretation of tax treaties.6
There remains "limited scholarly attention" upon the interpretation of
treaties in the United States,7 but the American literature specific to tax
6. See infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text (discussing the OECD/G2o Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting Project ("BEPS") and the 2015 U.S. draft model treaty provisions).
7. Michael P. Van Alstine, The JudicialPower and Treaty Delegation, go CALIF. L. REV. 1263,
1266 (2002) (recounting the paucity of treaty interpretation scholarship); see also Curtis J.
Mahoney, Note, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theoiy, and the Interpretation of Treaties,
116 YALE L.J. 824, 828 (2007) (same). For notable American contributions in the field of treaty
interpretation, see generally David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41
UCLA L. REV. 953 (1994) (recounting that treaties' status as sui generis instruments has created
a chaotic approach to their interpretation by the Court resulting largely in deference to the
executive branch); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649
(2000)
(arguing for Chevron deference with respect to the executive's foreign affairs
interpretations, including that of treaties); Robert M. Chesney, DisaggregatingDeference: The
judicialPowerand Executive Treaty Interpretations,92 IOWAL. REV. 1723, 1727 (2007) (arguing that
the deference doctrine is "unsettled" and suggesting "link[ing] the practice of deference to a
defensible theoretical foundation"); Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in
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treaties is particularly sparse. 8 A central goal of this Article, then, is to theorize
an approach to the interpretation of tax treaties.9 United States courts, for the
US. Treaty Interpretation,44 VA.J. INT'L L. 431 (2004) (arguing against the nationalist approach to
treaty interpretation on the basis of interpreting treaties like contracts);John Norton Moore, Treaty
Interpretation,the Constitution and the Rule ofLaw, 42 VA.J. INT'LL. 163, 174 (2001) (arguing against
the "the 'dual' approach" in treaty interpretation); Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretationof International
Agreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics of InternationalTreaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559 (1996) (critiquing the
Rehnquist Court's restrictive approach to treaty interpretation); Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty
Interpretation,86 TEX. L. REV. 777 (2oo8) (contending that Skidmore deference, rather than Chevron
deference, is appropriate in the treaty context); Andrew Tutt, Treaty Textualism, 39 YALEJ. INT'L L.
283 (2014) (setting forth an originalist argument for a textualist interpretation of treaties);
Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Callfor Resurrection,
93 GEO. L.J. 1885 (2005) [hereinafter Van Alstine, The Death ofGood Faith] (arguing for the revival
of a liberal interpretation of treaty obligations); Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty
Interpretation,146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1998) [hereinafter Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation]
(arguing that certain private law treaties delegate to courts the authority to supply substantive law
as gap-filling mechanisms in line with general treaty principles); and Mahoney, supra (proposing a
relational contract approach to treaty interpretation). The foreign treaty interpretation literature
is vast. For notable works, see generally 1 TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAw OF TREATIES: 30 YEARS ON (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds.,
1soo) (collecting treaty
articles); Rudolf Bernhardt, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on
Human Rights, in 42 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Ii (Jost Delbra5cke & Rainier
Hoffman eds., 1999); Rudolf Bernhardt, Interpretationin InternationalLaw, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 1416 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The
PracticalWorking of the Law of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAw 172 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed.
2010) (discussing "structural questions and fundamental problems" of treaty law); and I.M.
Sinclair, Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 47 (1970) (providing
background information on the Vienna Conference and.discussing issues that arose during the
conference debate).
8.
Although the American work on tax treaty interpretation is quite useful in application,
by and large, it addresses specific interpretive issues rather than recommending a general
interpretive approach. See, e.g., David H. Brockway, Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Their
Relationship to Statutory Law-A U.S. Perspective, in 35 REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-

FIFTH TAX CONFERENCE 619 (Canadian Tax Found. 1983); Michael S. Kirsch, The Limits of
Administrative Guidance in the Interpretationof Tax Treaties, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1063 (2009) (suggesting
that, to achieve deference in the judiciary, the U.S. Treasury should issue narrowly tailored
regulations instead of technical explanations to support its treaty interpretations); Russell K.
Osgood, Interpreting Tax Treaties in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, 17 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 255 (1984) (rejecting contractualism and reciprocity as bases for interpretation and
arguing instead for a presumption in favor of the source country); Sidney I. Roberts, Great-West
Life Assurance Company v. United States: Exploration of the U.S. Interpretationof Treaties, 30 CANADIAN
TAXJ. 759 (1982); Robert Thornton Smith, Tax Treaty Interpretationby theJudiciary, 4 9 TAX LAW.

845, 887-88 (1996)

(contending that a purposive approach should apply to tax treaty

interpretation);John A. Townsend, Tax Treaty Interpretation,55 TAX LAW. 219 (2001) (advocating
for more liberal use of Senate and executive materials). But see FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II (AM. LAW INST. 1992)
(condoning a plain meaning approach).
9.
The foreign academic literature on tax treaties is more comprehensive. See, e.g., 7
FRANCISCUs ANTONIUS ENGELEN, INTERPRETATION OF TAX TREATIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw
(2004); 54 FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION
(Michael Schilcher & Patrick Weninger eds., 2oo8); 3 TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION (Michael
Lang ed., 2001); KLAUS VOGEL ET AL., KLAUS VOGEL ON DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS: A

1 392
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most part, embrace an eclectic mix of national, international, bilateral, and
unilateral sources, and the unique characteristics of tax treaties and the
processes by which they are enacted support the courts' pragmatic approach
to interpretation.,o In many respects, this Article is a defense against
accusations that such reliance upon extrinsic materials is misplaced in the tax
treaty context.- This defense is particularly timely in light of: (1) recent
international consensus that treaties should not be used to achieve tax
abuse,12 making a plain meaning approach problematic; (2) Treasury's
renewed interest in issuing broadly applicable rules for tax treaties3 and its
imminent release of a new model tax treaty for the first time in a decade;14
and (3) the Supreme Court's recent willingness to interpret other treaties in
a more textualist manner,5 a development that should not be extended to
the income tax treaty context.' 6
COMMENTARY TO THE OECD-, UN- AND US-MODEL CONVENTIONS FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
TAxATION OF INCOME AND CAPITAL (1991); John F. Avery Jones et al., The Interpretation of Tax
Treaties with ParticularReference to Article 3(2) of the OECD Model-I, 1984 BRIT. TAX REV. 14; Int'l
Fiscal Ass'n, Interpretationof Tax Treaties, 40 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 75, 75-86

(1986); Sidney I. Roberts & Peter A. Glicklich, U.S. InterpretsNetherlands-US. Treaty by Reference to
Later Treaties with Other Nations, 34 CANADIAN TAXJ. 228 (1986); David Rosenbloom, Tax Treaty
Interpretation,34 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 543 (1980); Ian Sinclair, Interpretation
of Tax Treaties, 4o BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 75 (1986); Klaus Vogel, Double Tax
Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAw. 1 (1986); David A. Ward, Abuse of Tax
Treaties, in 15 ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 397 (Herbert H. Alpert & Kees van Raad eds.,
1993).
so.
I label this approach "pragmatic" since it rejects adherence to the foundationalist
theories of interpretation-intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism. Instead, it follows the
view of the pragmatists that no single interpretive source or methodology is adequate, that no
single plain meaning exists, and that no single legislative intent or purpose can be discovered.

Early pragmatists include, William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Daniel Farber. See William N.
Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321,
321-22 (199o); Daniel A. Farber, Book Review, The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretationin
ComparativePerspective, 8 1 CORNELLL. REV. 513, 522 (1996).
11.
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME
TAxATION II 27, 30-31.
12. See OECD, OECD/G2o BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT 4-7 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf. For the

final BEPS reports, see BEPS 2015 FinalReports, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/beps20 5 -final-reports.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2016). For a comprehensive review of the BEPS
proposals, see Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014).
Treasury officials have repeatedly suggested that the agency plans to work on general
13.
guidance on treaties at the request of many practitioners. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, General
Guidance on TreatiesExpectedfor Coming Business Plan, Treasury Official Says, DAILY TAX REP., Nov. 7,
2012, at G-i to G-2.
Treasury Releases Select Draft Provisionsfor Next U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, U.S. DEP'T
14.
TREASURY (May 20,2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jhlo0o57.aspx.
See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
15.
16.
In the statutory interpretation context,James Brudney and Corey Ditslear have similarly
cautioned against adoption of a monolithic approach toward interpreting statutes without

considering subject matter. James

J.

Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory

Interpretation:ComparingSupreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 123 1,
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Part II provides an overview of tax treaties and the tax treaty process. Part
III discusses the domestic and international backgrounds of interpretive
principles that guide treaty interpretation, both generally and with respect to
tax treaties. Part IV presents my view of a differentiated interpretation of
treaties using the instrument's degree of completeness as a criterion. It then
argues that tax treaties, as incomplete instruments, need to be interpreted
using a variety of extrinsic sources in a pragmatic fashion. Part V discusses
implementation issues, such as double taxation, and sets forth harmonization
devices, such as a loose ordering of sources and interpretive presumptions
that can ameliorate these concerns.
II.

INTRODUCTION TO TAX TREATIES
A.

i.

THEROLEOFTAX TREATIES

Avoidance of Double-Taxation

The stated purpose of tax treaties is to ameliorate or eliminate double
taxation.'7 The phenomenon of double taxation primarily occurs when both
a person's country of residence (the "residence country") as well as the
country from which the income is generated (the "source country") claim
jurisdiction to tax an item of income. Tax treaties resolve such conflicts in two
ways. First, they lower or eliminate the source country's withholding tax on
certain categories of income. They also require that the residence country
either exempts foreign source income or offers a foreign tax credit for taxes
paid in the source country. In the latter case, residence countries are able to
tax the foreign source income on a residual basis after allowing for a credit
for the tax paid in the source state.' 8 Second, tax treaties establish competent

1251-52 (2009). As evidence of this trend toward uniformity, the authors point to the decreasing
use of legislative history in the Court's tax law cases, in spite of a historical tradition of relying on
such materials in order to leverage the rich expertise of the tax-writing committees.
17. Almost all tax treaties emphasize their purpose of avoiding double taxation by stating in
the recital of the treaty the following: "Convention Between the United States of America and
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income." Philip F. Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The A.L. Tax Treaty Study-A
Critiqueand a Modest Proposal, 52 BuLL. SEC. TAx'N 731, 734 n.2 (1999).
18. The lower the withholding tax is in the source state, the higher the residual tax will be in
the residence state. For instance, assume Country A, the residence state, taxes income at a 35%
rate with a credit for foreign taxes paid. If a Country A resident earns $1oo income in Country B
that is taxed at a 30% withholding rate, then Country B will receive $30 of tax revenue and Country
A will receive only $5 of revenue. Now assume a treaty lowers the Country B withholding tax to
15%. In that case, Country B will receive $15 of tax revenue, and Country A will receive $20 of
revenue as opposed to $5 without the treaty. Why would Country B enter into this deal? For one,
it hopes that the lowering of withholding tax rates will increase foreign investment within its
borders. Additionally, because the benefits are reciprocal, it may receive more revenues with the
treaty than without it, depending upon the balance of investment flows between the two countries.
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authority procedures such that the tax authorities endeavor to resolve
taxpayer complaints of double taxation.'9
Although tax treaties require residence countries to alleviate double
taxation, countries typically offer such relief unilaterally under their domestic
law. Domestic law, however, may not completely eliminate double taxation.
For instance, domestic rules allocating income among related entities might
result in the denial of a foreign tax credit. The tax treaty regime purportedly
attempts to synthesize the taxing jurisdictions of the treaty partners to fill in
these types of gaps created by their domestic laws; however, its success in
doing so is questionable given the generality of treaty language.2o The treaties
themselves, as well as treaty commentaries, refer to the elimination of double
taxation as their primary goal, yet some commentators have emphasized that
the reduction of withholding taxes, as well as anti-avoidance concerns, have
become the primary focus of modern tax treaties.2.

2.

Prevention of Fiscal Evasion

Another stated goal of tax treaties is to limit fiscal evasion. One way
treaties achieve this is through information sharing provisions, which require
one country to disclose information regarding persons who have tax
obligations in the other country.2 2 These provisions override domestic
confidentiality laws that typically prevent governments from releasing tax
information. They thus provide the country that is trying to tax foreign source
income an easier means to identify such income. Treaties might also facilitate
the collection of unpaid taxes of nonresidents by enlisting the collection
authorities of the other country.

19.
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2oo6 art. 25 (U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY 2oo6). More recent treaties also provide for binding arbitration processes to resolve
double taxation issues. See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON

CAPITAL art. 25(5) (ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2014), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
treaties/201 4 -model-tax-convention-articles.pdf; Protocol Amending the Convention Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and Capital, U.S.-Fr. art. 26(5)-(6),Jan. 13, 2009, S. TREATYDOc. No. 111-4 (2009),
https://www.congress.gov/ 11i/cdoc/tdoc 4 /CDOC-11itdoc 4 .pdf; Convention Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income, U.S.-Belg. art. 24(7)-(8), NOV. 27, 2006, S. TREATY Doc. No. 110-3 (2007),
https://www.congress.gov/ i io/cdoc/tdoc3/CDOC-i iotdoc3.pdf; Protocol Amending the
Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, U.S.-Ger. art. 25(5), June 1, 2006, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 109-20 (2oo6), https://www.congress.gov/1og/cdoc/tdoC2o/CDOC-iogtdoc2o.pdf.
20.
See Postlewaite & Makarski, supra note 17, at 790.
21.
Patrick Driessen, Is There a Tax Treaty Insularity Complex , TAX NOTEs, May 7, 2012, at
745, 748.
22.
Postlewaite & Makarski, supranote 17, at 802.
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THE TAX TREATYPROCESS

The model treaties are the starting point for the tax treaty process. In
1928, the League of Nations released the world's first draft model doubleincome tax treaty. Today, more than 3000 such treaties exist in the world,
nearly 70 of which include the United States as a partner.2 3 The general form
of these treaties is heavily influenced by the League of Nations model tax
treaty, which is the predecessor of the OECD Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital.24 The United States Model Income Tax Convention,
in turn, is derived from the OECD Model.25
These model treaties provide the basic structure of the United States' tax
treaties, but there is some variation among the particular provisions in
individual treaties. Representatives from the United States, generally officials
from the Treasury Department's Office of International Tax Counsel and the
Office of Tax Analysis (Business and International Taxation), along with staff
from the Internal Revenue Service and the State Department, negotiate with
officials from the other treaty country on the terms of the treaty. The
negotiating history represents the official oral and written communications
between the treaty partners.26
Once finalized, the State Department approves the treaty text, and the
treaty is signed by officials of the United States and the other country before
it is given to the President along with a letter describing the general terms of
the treaty. The President then forwards the treaty to the Senate for its "Advice
and Consent" as mandated in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.27 In the
Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee reviews the treaty, as well as
technical explanations provided by the joint Committee on Taxation ('JCT")
and the Treasury Department. Staff from both the JCT and Treasury may
testify during hearings. After this review, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee votes to recommend the treaty to the Senate. A Senate Report
from the Committee often accompanies this recommendation.2 8
After the Committee sends the treaty to the Senate floor, the full Senate
debates the recommendation of the Committee. The Senate's consent to
ratification is obtained upon a vote of two-thirds of the Senators present. The

23.

OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 8 (2013); Stafford Smiley,

Mutual AdministrativeAssistance in Tax Matters, CORP. TAX'N, May-June 2013, at 21.
24. Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1o66 (1997).
25. Id.at io66n.i8i.
26. Townsend, supra note 8, at 226.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur....").
28. See Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 22
(2013) (providing a brief overview of the tax treaty process).
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President then signs the treaty, which enters into force once each country
notifies the other that ratification has taken place.9
The Senate's constitutional role in the treaty-making process can prove
frustrating to our treaty partners. Not only does its involvement slow down the
treaty process, but sometimes the Foreign Relations Committee or an
individual Senator inserts a "reservation," thus predicating consent on the
removal or modification of a treaty provision. In such cases, the treaty partners
must renegotiate the treaty. In the tax treaty context, Senate reservations are
not a matter of course, but they do arise somewhat regularly.so In recent years,
the Senate has altogether failed to provide its consent to numerous tax
treaties, adding further uncertainty to the process.s'
C.

THE INTERACTION OF TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause to mean that
treaties and statutes have equal legal status. If a conflict results between the
two, then the instrument enacted last trumps under the last in time rule.32 In
the tax context, this canon has essentially been codified in section 894(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code ("Code").ss A companion to the last in time rule
is the interpretive rule, called the "Charming Betsy canon," which states that
statutes should be construed as to avoid conflicts with international law.34

U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2oo6 art. 28 (U.S. DEP'T OF
29.
TREASURY 2006).

3o. See Kevin C. Kennedy, ConditionalApproval of Treaties by the US. Senate, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 89, 112-14, 114 n.i s8, 157-59 app.9 (1996) (noting that reservations were
attached to 18 out of 97 tax treaties).
31.

Diane Ring, When InternationalTax Agreements Fail at Home: A U.S. Example, 41 BROOKLYN

J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
32.

Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888).

Section 894(a)(1) requires that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be applied to any
33.
taxpayer with due regard to any treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such
taxpayer." I.R.C. § 894(a) (1) (2012). Section 78 5 2(d) provides that "neither the treaty nor the
law shall have preferential status by reason of its being a treaty or law." I.R.C. § 785 2(d)(1)
(2012). According to the conference report, the "due regard" language in section 894(a) "simply
provides for giving the treaty that regard which it is due under the ordinary rules of interpreting

the interactions of statutes and treaties," thus "where a treaty obligation has been superseded for
internal U.S. law purposes, no effect need be given to the treaty under the agreement's
provision." TECHNICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE Acr OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. oo-1 104, Vol.
2, at 12-13 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). This interpretation comports with section 894's cross-reference

to section 7852, which essentially codifies the last in time rule. Id. The enacted language of
sections 894(a) and 7852(d) was a compromise between the House's position that later enacted
statutes would always take precedence over treaties, regardless of intent and Treasury's position
that Congress must explicitly override a treaty in order for the statute to trump. SeeIrwin Halpern,
United States Treaty Obligations, Revenue Laws, andNew Section 7 85 2(d) of the InternalRevenue Code, 5
FLA. INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (1989); see also Kathleen Matthews, Treasury Encouragedby Finance Treaty Override

Substitute, TAX NOTES, Aug. 15, 1988, at 662, 662-6434. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,

118

(1804).
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III. BACKGROUND OF INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES

A.

TREATY INTERPRETATIONIN THE UN=TE

STATES

Scholars have long debated whether to interpret a treaty like a contractthat is, interpreting treaties to give effect to the drafters' intent-or like a
statute, where interpretive methodologies such as textualism or purposivism
may come into play. The Court has purported to do the former,3s although
some have argued that "while the prevailing rhetoric of [treaty] interpretation
is contractual, the underlying idiom and approach is statutory."s 6 Others
contend that treaties are sui generis, and that neither contractual nor statutory
interpretive principles guide the Court; instead, it decides treaty cases largely
out of deference to the executive branch, which thus favors a flexible
interpretive method.s7 Nonetheless, the contractual approach still remains
influential among U.S. courts as a whole. As I will discuss, however, neither
analogy is particularly useful or descriptive in guiding the interpretation of
tax treaties.
Contract interpretation leads courts beyond the four corners of the
contract to effectuate the parties' subjective intent. The Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law embraces the relevancy of the contractual
methodology to treaty interpretation in concluding that in the "United States
tradition the primary object of interpretation is to 'ascertain the meaning
intended by the parties"' rather than focus simply on the text.38 The Supreme

35. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004) (noting that it is "the
Court's responsibility to read the treaty in a manner 'consistent with the shared expectations of
the contracting parties'"); Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) (same); Washington v. Wash.
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979) (noting that a treaty is a
contract between two sovereign nations); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) ("Writers of
authority agree that treaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which govern the
interpretation of contracts in writing between individuals, and are to be executed in the utmost
good faith, with a view to making effective the purposes of the high contracting parties."); Tucker
v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902) (citing I JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
IAw 174 (1826), and analogizing treaties to private contracts); Fourteen Diamond Rings v.
United States, 183 U.S. 176, 182 (1901) (Brown,J., concurring) (stating that "[i]n its essence [a
treaty] is a contract. It differs from an ordinary contract only in being an agreement between
independent states instead of private parties"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581
(1832) ("What is a treaty? The answer is, it is a compact formed between two nations or
communities, having the right of self government."); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314
(1829) (recognizing that Article II treaties are not acts of legislation but contracts between
nations); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 219 (1796) (same); Coplin v. United States, 6 Cl.
Ct. 115, 126 n.il (1984) (same), rev'd, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. O'Connor

v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986).
Bederman, supra note 7, at 1022; see alsoVan Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, supra
36.
note 7, at 691 ("[T]he Court's treaty jurisprudence has fallen under the strong influence of a
resurgent strain of formalism in domestic statutory interpretation.").
37.

Bederman, supra note 7, at 1o26.

38.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
reporters' note 4 (AM. LAw INST. 1986).

LAW
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Court has also embraced intentionalism, at times emphasizing that treaty
interpretation lends itself to even more liberal use of external sources than
contract interpretation in order to effectuate such intent.39 Later courts have
regularly turned to the negotiating history of the treaty (travaux priparatoires)
and the parties' subsequent practice as evidence of intent.4o American courts
have scrutinized correspondence between nations, domestic law, parallel
treaties, and subsequent treaty modifications to discern subsequent practice
of the treaty parties.41
Advocates for interpreting treaties as contracts sometimes emphasize the
consistency such an approach provides. Sital Kalantry argues that the
contractual approach would more likely lend itself to uniform interpretations
by U.S., foreign, and international courts.42 According to Kalantry, this is
because these courts will review "the same body of extrinsic information" and
will also look to each other's interpretations as persuasive authority in
adjudicating their own interpretation.43
Kalantry also contends that treaties are structurally more similar to
contracts than to statutes. She argues that although "treaties have the [legal]
effect of statutes," their characteristics "should guide what interpretive
principles courts apply."44 Thus, because both contracts and treaties have
parties that sign, negotiate, draft, approve, amend and are bound by the
instruments, treaties are more akin to contracts.45 Statutes, on the other hand,
are approved by legislators and drafted by them and their staff and are
intended to govern people within the relevant jurisdiction rather than the
parties involved in the legislative process.4 6 Another argument advanced in
favor of a contractual approach is that, although the Senate is involved in
treaty approval, the executive represents the nation's interests in negotiating
the treaty. 4 7 Finally, unlike the statutory context where Article i, Section 7
requires only majoritarian agreement to the text, which in turn represents
compromises among competing interest groups and legislators, treaties
represent a true "meeting of the minds" with regard to the treaty's meaning.4 8

Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) ("[Treaties
39.
are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may
look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical

construction adopted by the parties.").
40.
41.

Bederman, supranote 7, at 970-71.
Id. at 972.

See generally Sital Kalantry, The Intent-to-Benefit: Individually Enforceable Rights Under
42.
InternationalTreaties, 44 STAN.J. INT'L L. 63 (2008).
43.

Id. at oo.

44.
45.
46.

Id. at 89-go.
Id. at 85-87.
Id.

47.

See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 835-36.

48.

See id. at 840-42.
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Although a contractual approach to treaty interpretation has dominated
the discourse of federal courts, some argue that the Senate's special role in
the treaty-making process transforms treaties beyond a simple contract
between the executives of nations.49 Express Senate reservations almost
certainly bind courts interpreting the treaty,so and formal Senate
interpretations also seem to be heavily influentials' What role the Senate's
informal views on the interpretation of the treaty should have in the judicial
interpretative process raises a more difficult question. Such views may not be
formally declared, but they may be unearthed in the treaty's "legislative
history," which records the back-and-forth between the Senate and the
Executive during the treaty-making process.>= Emphasis on the Senate's role
in treaty-making would allow a greater role for informal materials, such as
reports by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, statements of Senate
leaders, as well as executive branch sources that influenced the Senate. While
many courts have relied upon such materials, few have explicitly discussed
their proper influence.ss
Courts also give deference to bilateral and unilateral executive branch
materials.54 This position is rare in the international community but is

See Townsend, supra note 8, at 244.

50.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 314(1)

&

49.

cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1986); Bederman, supra note 7, at 958. Since the treaty partner allowed
the treaty to enter into force with the express conditions, it could even be argued that such Senate
conditions are binding on the treaty partner. Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The
Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571,
602-03 (1991).
51. Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 351-53 (1945); Haver
v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (g Wall.) 32, 35 (1869); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAWOF
THE UNITED STATES § 314 cmt. d; Bederman, supra note 7, at 958. But see N.Y. Indians v. United
States, 170 U.S. 1, 23 (1898) (failing to rely on an express Senate interpretation when the
President had rejected the interpretation).
Bederman, supra note 7, at 958.
52.
53. Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397, 403 (1985); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 417-18 (1984); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S.
243, 250, 257 (1984); Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 527 n.5 (1951); Cook v. United
States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 n.19 (1933); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d
1475, 1489-go (D.C. Cir. 1991); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370,
376 ( 7 th Cir. 1985). But seeCoplin v.United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 115, 131 n.16 (1984) (declining to
follow an interpretation that tracked an exchange between a Senate and an executive branch
representative because the interpretation was not transmitted to the other treaty partner), rev'd,
761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986).
54. The origins of executive branch deference in the treaty context can be traced to Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829). Courts have continued to embrace it throughout
the decades. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982);
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("[T]he meaning given [to treaties] by the
departments of government ... charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great
weight."); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 220-21 (1942); Nielsen v.Johnson, 279 U.S. 47,
52-53 (1929); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 223 (1923); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,
468 (1913); Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 ( 7 th Cir. 1967). But see Trans World
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rationalized by the special constitutional role of the Executive in treatymaking and traditional administrative law principles of congressional
delegation and institutional expertise.55 Some U.S. courts have even deferred
to the executive branch over the objections of the treaty partner.5 6 Courts
have, however, refused to confer such deference in the face of prior
conflicting executive interpretations, constitutional concerns, or poor
reasoning on the part of the executive branch.57
Despite the Court's emphasis upon the parties' intent in interpreting
treaties, Justice Scalia made efforts to abandon such an approach in favor of
a textualist reading of treaties, thus interpreting treaties more like statutes.
For instance, in United States v. Stuart, the majority drew support from the
Senate pre-ratification debate, negotiating materials, and past practices of the
treaty parties in interpreting the treaty.5 8 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Scalia vigorously argued that separation of powers and rule of law concerns
dictate that the Court restrict its inquiry in treaty interpretation cases to the
four corners of the agreement.59 He further argued that the Constitution
provides the Senate with only formal means to act upon treaties and to give
credence to informal materials lies in tension with constitutional structure.6o
Later that year, in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, the majority opinion, written
by Justice Scalia, took a textualist approach to treaty interpretation. 6' In his
concurring opinion, Justice Brennan asserted that the majority was wrong in
ignoring extrinsic evidence in ascertaining the government's intent.6 2 A few
years later, however, the Court reaffirmed a non-textualist approach to treaty
interpretation in Sale v. HaitianCenters CounciL 6s There, the majority implicitly

Airlines, Inc., 466 U.S. at 276 n.5 (noting that treaty interpretation of agency "not entitled to any
special deference").
See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 7, at 702-03 (arguing that treaty interpretation by the
55.
executive branch is within the ambit of Chevron analysis).
56. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933) ("Until a treaty has been denounced,
it is the duty of both the government and the courts to sanction the performance of the
obligations reciprocal to the rights which the treaty declares and the government asserts, even
though the other party to it holds to a different view of its meaning." (citing Charlton v. Kelly,
229 U.S. 447, 472-73 (1913))).
57. See Bederman, supranote 7, at 962.

58. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
59. See id. at 371 (Scalia,J., concurring).
6o. Id. at 375. Scalia also argued that the Supreme Court, prior to Stuart, has never
consulted Senate materials to interpret a treaty and that two lower court decisions in 1g88 are
the first federal decisions to do so. He then criticized the Restatement (Third) on the Foreign
Relations Law for approving of such materials. Id. at 375-76. A Harvard Law professor
subsequently wrote a scathing critique of Scalia's description of the law, unearthing several such
cases in both categories. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, Senate Materials and
Treaty Interpretation:Some ResearchHints for the Supreme Court, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 546 (1989).
61. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
62. Id. at 136 (BrennanJ., concurring).
63. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
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invoked the canon of absurd results to break away from the treaty's text, 64
instead relying upon domestic legislation that used parallel language to that
in the treaty, 65 as well as negotiating and legislative history.66 Justice Scalia
joined in the majority opinion, while justice Blackmun, in dissent, decried the
majority's rejection of plain language and reliance on extrinsic evidence. 67
The Court again applied a more flexible interpretive approach in Olympic
Airways, where the majority looked to not only dictionary definitions but also
the views of other countries in interpreting the Warsaw Convention. 8 Even in
his dissent, Justice Scalia cited to decisions of foreign courts.6 9
More recently, however, the Court returned to a more formalist
approach to treaty interpretation in Medellin v. Texas, which famously held
that decisions of the International Court of Justice are not binding under
domestic law since the operative treaty was not self-executing.70 In the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the text of the treaty anticipated
future legislative action because it required only that the parties "undertake[]
to comply with the decision of the [International Court of Justice]."7' In so
doing, the Court largely focused on treaty text as opposed to other possible
sources of meaning in ascertaining whether the treaty was self-executing.72 As
a result, many point to Roberts' majority opinion as further evidence of the
Court's formalist leanings in interpreting treaties.73 Even in an opinion
criticized for its wooden textualism, however, the majority cited to Senate
ratification debates74 while also condoning the use of negotiating history and
the treaty partners' post-ratification understandings (without explicitly
relying upon them).75 Medellin could thus be understood as placing textualism

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 18o.
Id. at 176, 184-87.
Id. at 194-95 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 656-57 (2004).
6g. Id. at 659-6o (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
71. Id. at 508 (emphasis omitted).
See Curtis A. Bradley, SelfExecution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 177-78
72.
(discussing the Court's textual emphasis as relevant in ascertaining the views of the Senate);
Carlos Manuel Vhizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and theJudicialEnforcement
of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REv. 599, 659 (2oo8) (discussing the Court's textual focus in supporting
the conclusion that the Court attempted to reconstruct the treaty parties' intent rather than the
unilateral view of U.S. treaty-makers).
73. See DavidJ. Bederman, Medellin's New Paradigmfor Treaty Interpretation, 1o2 AM.J. INT'LL.
529, 532 (2008) ;Jean Galbraith, The Oxford Guide to Treaties Symposium: ComparingInternationaland
US Approaches to Interpretation, OPINION JURIS (Nov. 9, 2012, 11:3o AM), http://opiniojuris.org/
2012/11 /og/the-oxford-guide-to-treaties-symposium-comparing-international-and-us-approachesto-interpretation.
74. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 554-55 (citing the Senate's 1945 and 1946 hearings and debates).
75. Id. at 5o6 ("The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins
with its text.").
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first but also as sanctioning "[a] new eclecticism in the selection of extrinsic
sources

."76

B.

THE VIENNA CONVENTION

The Vienna Convention sets forth rules of interpretation governing
international agreements and guides the judicial approach to treaty
interpretation in many jurisdictions.77 The United States is a signatory to the
Convention, but the Senate has never consented to its ratification.8
Nonetheless, many lower federal and state courts routinely turn to the
interpretive principles set forth in the Vienna Convention79 and the State
Department accepts it as an "authoritative guide" to customary principles of
international law.so Still, the Convention's authority in the United States is
questionable. The Supreme Court has only cited to it twice and in an
incidental fashion.81 Indeed, the plain meaning approach of the Vienna
Convention lies in tension with the Court's predominantly intentionalist
approach.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty be interpreted
"in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."82 "Purpose"

76.
77.

Bederman, supranote 73, at 540.
See generally Vienna Convention, supranote 1.

78.

Robert E. Dalton, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Consequencesfor the United

States, 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 276, 276 ( 984).
79. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F. 3 d 942, 949 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002) ("While the
United States is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention, it is the policy of the United States to
apply articles 31 and 32 as customary international law."); Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F. 3 d 1279, 1296 n.40 (11th Cir. 1999) (same); Kreimerman v. Casa
Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F. 3 d 634, 638 n.9 ( 5 th Cir. 1994) (same); see also Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed.
Express Corp., 247 F-3 d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the court applies customary
international law principles elucidated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties when
interpreting treaties even though the United States is not a signatory); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.

v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361-62 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) ("Rather than having evolved from a judicial common law,...
principles of treaty construction are themselves codified [] in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties."); Risinger v. SOC LLC, No. 2:12-CV-ooo6 3 -MMD-PAL, 2014 WL 804802,
at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2014) ("Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, our Court relies on it as an authoritative guide to the
customary international law of treaties, insofar as it reflects actual state practices." (quoting Mora
v. NewYork, 5 2 4 F. 3 d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008))); Busby v. State, 40 P. 3 d 807, 814-15 (Alaska

Ct. App. 2002) (applying the interpretive principles of the Vienna Convention).
8o. Report from William Rogers, Sec'y of State, to President Richard Nixon (Oct. 18, 1971),
65 DEP'T ST. BULL. 684, 685 (1971).
81. See, e.g., Sale, 509 U.S. at 191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the Vienna Convention
as incidental support for the common law notion that a treaty must be interpreted according to
its "ordinary meaning"); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (distinguishing between the
definition of treaties in the Vienna Convention and the Constitution); see also Criddle, supra note

7, at 434.
82.

Vienna Convention, supra note i, art. 31(1).
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is not the subjective intent of the parties but rather constitutes the goal of the
treaty.83 "Context" can be unearthed using any corollary agreement made by
the treaty partners in connection with the treaty. Article 31 further provides
that the interpreter take into account subsequent agreements by the treaty
parties, subsequent practices that reveal the parties' agreement as to
interpretive issues, and any relevant rules of international law. The
Convention prescribes deviating from the plain meaning only if a special
meaning reflects mutual intent.84 Article

32

provides additional rules of

interpretation, which allow for the use of supplementary materials such as the
negotiating history of the treaty (1) in order to confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of article 31L; or (2) in order to construe the text if the
meaning is "ambiguous or obscure" or leads to "absurd" or "unreasonable"
results. 85
The drafters of the Convention intended to adopt a plain meaning
approach because they thought this methodology reflected customary
practice 86 and would give nations less flexibility to pursue unilateralist
interpretations. 87 Thus, the Vienna Convention steers courts away from a
contractual approach, relying upon intent only in narrow circumstances. 88
The drafters of the Convention also explicitly rejected an amendment by
Professor Myres McDougal, a developer of the "New Haven School" of
interpretation. The New Haven School emphasized the importance of fluidity
in the interpretive approach in order to discern "the value and policy
considerations" that give rise to the obligations of the parties.89 This
interpretive method was also guided by the importance of upholding "basic
norms of world legal order."9o McDougal's proposal would have "eliminate [d]
the rigidities, restrictions and hierarchical distinctions" by prescribing "[n] o
fixed hierarchy ... among the elements of interpretation."9' It also would
have adopted a wide range of interpretive sources "including ordinary

83. Vogel, supra note 9, at 35.
84. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 31(4).
85. Id. art. 32.
86. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 607 (2d ed. 1973).
87. U.N, Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records: Summary Records of the Plenary
Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Wile, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 3 9 / 11/Add.i (1968).
88. A drafter of the Vienna Convention stated that "the starting point of interpretation is
the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the
parties." Report of theInternationalLawCommission on the Work ofItsEighteenth Session, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/6 3 og/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMMIsSION
220, U.N. Doc. A/CN. /1914
8g. Richard A. Falk, On Treaty Interpretationand the New Haven Approach: Achievements and
Prospects, 8 VA.J. INT'L L. 323, 340 (1967).
go. Id. at 341.gi. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 87, at 168. I discuss the Vienna
Convention's rejection of McDougal's amendment and its implications for the arguably similar
pragmatic approach prescribed herein. See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text.
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meaning, subsequent practice and preparatory work, but not excluding
others that might be also relevant."9
Instead, the Vienna Convention largely discredits extra-textual materials
beyond those used in the preparation of the treaty.9s It does not explicitly
accept unilateral interpretations of the treaty, for instance Treasury Technical
Explanations or Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports, and it
prescribes customary international law as a gap-filling mechanism.94 The
Convention thus adopts a stance that formalists might embrace, although its
acceptance of a limited array of extrinsic materials might still prove
controversial to pure textualists.
The Vienna Convention's predominant focus on plain meaning has been
generally accepted abroad and has led to a potential disparity between the
interpretative approach of the United States and that of other nations.95
Although lower U.S. courts sometimes look to the interpretive principles of
the Vienna Convention in construing treaties, the effect of the Convention
upon U.S. treaty interpretation has been only "to check slightly the use of
extra-textual means of interpretation."96
C.

U.S. PRAGMATISMIN TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION

Generally, U.S. courts enthusiastically embrace the use of extrinsic
sources in the tax treaty context.97 The starting point of interpreting a U.S.
income tax treaty is the treaty language, which controls unless the result is
inconsistent with the intent of the treaty-makers or the purpose of the treaty.98
But in piecing together intent or purpose, U.S. courts often look outside the
treaty text. They employ canons of interpretation.99 They resort to negotiating
history materials to arrive at the treaty's meaning.- They also look to
materials from the ratification process, such as Senate committee reports,'o'
92.

Id. at 168.

93. See Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation,supra note 7, at 744 (stating that the Vienna
Convention accepts extrinsic sources only in narrow circumstances).
Vienna Convention, supranote i, art. 31(3) (c); Vogel, supra note 9, at 34-35, 37-39.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325
cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1986); Bederman, supra note 7, at 972.
96. Bederman, supranote 7, at 975.
97. The American Legal Institute's Federal Income Tax Project also generally supports the
American embrace of extrinsic materials in the tax treaty context. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:
94.
95.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II 28-29 (AM. LAW INST. 1992).

98. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 (1982) (deferring to the
plain language of the treaty when both treaty partners agreed with such interpretation); Maximov
v. United States 373 U.S. 49, 51 (1963) (adopting an interpretation that was "consonant with
[the treaty's] language, purpose and intent").
99.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 325 f-4-

soo. Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985) ("In interpreting a treaty it is proper, of course,
to refer to the records of its drafting and negotiation.").
tot. See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989); Pierpoint v. United States, No. 830354-2, 1983 WL 1665 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 1983) (reading committee report to determine
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interpretations from the executive branch, o2 the subsequent practice of treaty
partners,os and commentaries on model treaties. 0 4 When treaties are silent
on an issue, they may look to the domestic law to fill gaps in meaning, even
where not specifically directed to do so by the treaty,o5 and may also employ
common law anti-abuse doctrines to combat tax shelters.o" Resort to these
varied, often unilateral, sources means that U.S. courts are unmoored from
both the plain meaning and intentionalist approaches. Instead, they pursue a
pragmatic approach to tax treaty interpretation, which is best exemplified by
exploring a few cases.
In Great-West Life Assurance Co. v. United States, for instance, the Court
considered whether a provision in the U.S.-Canada treaty, which prevented
the United States from taxing interest paid between Canadian corporations,
applied when a U.S. permanent establishment received the interest.o7 The
parties stipulated that the literal language of the treaty applied, but the Court
allowed the United States to tax the interest after relying upon the treaty's
negotiating history, subsequent statutory changes, interpretations by the
Treasury and State Departments, and treaty purpose.os
United States v. Stuart is a case that, as discussed above, is well known for
its discussion of Senate materials. It involved an exchange of information
provision under the 1942 U.S.-Canada treaty, which obligated a treaty
partner to obtain and send tax information to the other treaty partner that it

nonexemption of U.S. income taxes); Great-W. Life Assurance Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d 18o
(Ct. Cl. 1982) (relying upon U.S. legislative history to hold that interest paid by a Canadian
corporation to a Canadian life insurance corporation was not exempt under the U.S--Canada
treaty); Crow v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 376, 392 (1985) (examining committee reports to determine
relationship between 26 U.S.C. § 877 and the treaty's savings clause); Burghardt v. Comm'r, 8o
T.C. 705, 7o8-og (1983) (interpreting exemption of estates of nonresident aliens to be liberal
in light of committee report).
102.
See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F. 3 d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Snap-On Tools,
Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1045, 1065 (1992); Taisei Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 104
T.C. 535, 558 (1995).
Subsequent practices may reflect bilateral agreement on interpretations, in which case
103.
they are highly influential. See, e.g., El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167 (1999);
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996).
See, e.g., N.W. Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Comm'r, 107 T.C. 363, 378 (1gg6); Taisei
104.
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 104 T.C. at 548.
105. For instance, in Maximov v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the treaty
exemption for U.K. citizens and residents on their capital gains did not apply to U.K. beneficiaries
of a U.S. trust that realized capital gains. Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 4g, 56 (1963). The
Court reasoned that, in the absence of treaty text on point, domestic law, which defines a trust as
a separate U.S. taxpayer, applied to deny the treaty benefits to the U.K. beneficiaries. Id. at 51-53.
1o6. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm'r, 14o T.C. 15, 48 (2013) (denying a foreign
tax credit since "U.S. tax laws and treaties do not recognize sham transactions ... that [lack]
economic substance as valid for tax purposes"), aff'd, 8o F. 3 d 104 (2d Cir. 2015).
107. Great-W. Life Assurance Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d 18o, 185 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
1o8. Id.att88-89.
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was "in a position to obtain under its revenue laws."1o9 After the treaty was
signed, the U.S. domestic law had been changed to prohibit the IRS from
issuing a summons order if the underlying investigation was criminal and had
been referred to the DOJ.'o Pursuant to the treaty, Canadian officials asked
the IRS to provide bank records that were pertinent to a Canadian taxpayer's
domestic liability." The taxpayer argued that the U.S. domestic law allows
the IRS to exercise its summons power only if it determines that the Canadian
tax investigation had not yet reached the stage that would be comparable to a
referral to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. l2
The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument, reasoning that the
ratification history, including Senate legislative history and the President's
transmittal message and proclamation, was silent as to any such restrictions."s
The Court also looked to the subsequent practice of the treaty partners to
conclude that, since the treaties' enactment, the IRS had regularly complied
with the information exchange provision without inquiring whether the
Canadian investigation was criminal."4 As mentioned above,"5 Stuart is
notable for its concurring opinion by Justice Scalia, who strongly objected to
the majority's use of unilateral materials in the interpretation process since
6
such statements did not reflect the shared expectations of the parties..
Other courts have ostensibly relied upon the plain meaning of the statute
but generally look to extrinsic materials to support their analysis. Xerox Corp.
v. United States involved the timing of when the U.K. Advanced Corporate Tax
("ACT") could be considered a deemed paid tax under section 902 of the
Code, which allows the U.S. corporation to credit foreign taxes paid by a
foreign subsidiary upon receipt of a dividend from such subsidiary.n7 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court's decision, holding in
8
favor of the taxpayer's position that the credit could be claimed currently.
In so doing, the Federal Circuit relied upon extrinsic evidence since the treaty
was silent on the issue of timing."9 The court observed that U.K. officials
contested receipt of the Technical Explanation .o and that the Treasury's

log. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365 (1989) (quoting article XIX of the 1942
U.S.-Canada treaty).
1o.

Id. at 361-62.

111.

Id. at 356.

112.

Id. at 357.

Id. at 366-68.
Id. at 369.
See supranotes 58-60 and accompanying text.
i16. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 373-77.
See generallyXerox Corp. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 4 5 5 (1988), rev'd, 41 F. 3 d 647 (Fed.
117.
Cir. 1994).
118. Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F. 3 d 647, 66o (Fed. Cir. 1994).
1ig. Id.at652.
113.
114.
115.

120.

Id. at 656.
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approach was rejected in the Senate Executive Report.'- The court also
concluded that the revenue procedure was at odds with the treaty's plain
language and the treaty's purpose against double taxation."== The court
reasoned that revenue procedures did not carry the same weight as a
regulation and did not bind the court's interpretation.' 3
Snap-On Tools v. United States also concerned timing issues involving the
payment of the ACT under the 1945 United States-United Kingdom tax
treaty."14 The court rejected the IRS's denial of a carryback of the associated
tax credit. 5 Domestic law allowed such a carryback, but according to the IRS,
the treaty overrode the domestic rule."=6 In reaching these conclusions, the
Claims Court relied upon several principles of treaty interpretation. After
noting that treaties are to be construed liberally and in a manner akin to
contracts, the court also observed that reliance upon extra-textual materials is
more common in the case of treaties..27 Nonetheless, the court cited Scalia's
concurrence in Stuart to reject consultation of the Technical Explanation,
which set forth the IRS's argument, since it did not evince the mutual intent
of the treaty parties." 8 In justifying its interpretation, the court also noted
that, although the later enacted instrument generally takes precedent as
between statutes and treaties, the court has a duty to give effect to both if it is
so possible (essentially applying the CharmingBetsy canon)., 29 Still, the Court
did rely upon a statement in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report
that the treaty was not intended to repeal the foreign tax credit rules and
concluded that the legislative history contained nothing to support the IRS's
interpretation.1so Furthermore, the court examined the subsequent conduct
of the United States in noting that the domestic 6o-day rule was repealed years
later, indicating that Congress thought legislative action was needed to
reconcile the treaty with domestic law.'s'
These two cases, Xerox and Snap-On Tools, reveal the difficulty in making
blanket statements regarding U.S. treaty interpretation. Although both lower
courts expressed hesitation to rely upon certain unilateral documents like the
Technical Explanation, seemingly embracing the contractual approach, they

121.
122.

123.
124.
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.

130.
131.

Id. at 655.
Id. at 652-54, 656.
Id.at6 5 6-57.
Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1045
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 10 5 2.

Id. at 1o64-65.
Id. at 1o66.
Id. at 1o68.
Id. at io68 &n.22.
Id. at1o74.

(1992).
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examined treaty purpose and unilateral Senate legislative history.132 Other
lower courts have relied on the treaty's Technical Explanation,3s and the
rejection of the Technical Explanations in Xerox and Snap-On Tools may be
explained by their conflict with other unilateral extrinsic evidence.
The official Commentaries that accompany the OECD Model Tax Treaty
provide another extrinsic source of tax treaty interpretations. These are most
helpful when the treaty language at issue is taken from the OECD Model
Treaty. U.S. courts have relied heavily upon the commentaries. 34 Complex
issues arise involving the commentaries since they are ambulatory in nature.
Because the commentaries are often restated or revised, courts must decide
whether to apply the interpretation from the commentaries in effect at the
time of the treaty's negotiation, at the time of the treaty's application, or at
the time of the court's decision. U.S. courts have generally followed the
ambulatory approach, applying the commentaries currently in effect.135
This discussion included only a sampling of the U.S. case law on tax treaty
interpretation, but the heavy reliance on varied extrinsic sources illustrates
that the American judiciary does not strictly adhere to the Vienna
Convention. Additionally, reliance on unilateral or ambulatory sources
suggests that the courts are not exclusively focused on mutual intent either.
Instead, tax treaty interpretation in the United States approximates a

See Great-W. Life Assurance Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d i8o, 19o (Ct. Cl. 1982)
132.
(relying upon U.S. legislative history to hold that interest paid by a Canadian corporation to a
Canadian life insurance corporation was not exempt under the U.S.-Canada treaty); Pierpoint v.
United States, No. 83-0354-2, 1983 WL 1665 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 1983) (reading committee report
to determine nonexemption of U.S. income taxes); Crow v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 376, 392 (1985)
(examining committee reports to determine relationship between 26 U.S.C. § 877 and the
treaty's savings clause); Burghardt v. Comm'r, 8o T.C. 705, 708-og (1983) (interpreting an
exemption of estates of nonresident aliens to be liberal in light of a committee report).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368 n.8 (1989) (noting the Technical
Explanation's silence on the issue at hand); Clayton v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 628, 654-56
(1995) (relying on the Technical Explanation of U.S.-Canada Treaty to interpret the source of
trust income); Taisei Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 535, 558 (1995) (relying upon
the Technical Explanation of a prior 1970 U.S.-Belgium treaty in interpreting whether
reinsurance was to be included within the coverage of the independent agent provision in the
1971 U.S.-Japan treaty); Riley v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 414, 427 (1980) (comparing the Technical
Explanations of two treaties in determining the residency of a temporary visitor to Canada).
134. See, e.g., Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999) (reading
the OECD commentaries to support the taxpayer's argument that the Treasury regulation's
formulaic allocation of interest expense was not intended by the treaty parties); Pekar v. Comm'r,
113 T.C. 158 (iggg) (referring to the Technical Explanation to the U.S. Model Income Tax
Treaty in interpreting whether a beneficiary of the U.S-Germany treaty had to reduce his foreign
tax credit in accordance with the domestic limitations under the Alternative Minimum Tax);
N.W. Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Comm'r, 107 T.C. 363 (1996) (reasoning that guidance under
the OECD model treaty supported the taxpayer's interpretation and that the later enacted treaty
language trumped the conflicting domestic statute).
See, e.g., Taisei Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 104 T.C. at 558 (effectively adopting the
135.
interpretation supplied by later commentaries, which conflicted with the interpretation of the
commentaries at the time the treaty went into effect).
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pragmatic approach. The remainder of this Article defends this methodology
on both positive and normative grounds.
IV.

THE NECESSITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION

A.

DIFFERENTIATED TREATYINTERPRETATION

The Vienna Convention's interpretive regime governs all treaties and is
considered to be customary international law. Yet, there is also consensus that
certain treaties warrant differentiated interpretive rules.'3 6 Such claims often
resort to a bald assertion of "special subject matter."37 Scholars and advocates
make the case for individualized treaty interpretation in the context of human
rights, the environment, and the protection of civilians in armed conflict,
among others, resting upon "a mere assertion about the importance of the
treaty's subject matter."3 8 Problematically, it is difficult to unearth normative
values from the category of the treaty alone. Thus, subject matter becomes an
unprincipled rationale for differentiated interpretation.'s This is not to say
that human rights treaties do not deserve liberal interpretation. But deeper
analysis of the norms driving such an interpretation is more helpful in guiding
treaty-makers since such rights are likely not limitless. Additionally, such an
analysis is helpful when treaties involve several subject matters, as is often the
case. 140

Each treaty's specific object and purpose provides another justification
for differentiated interpretation, and hence the intent of the treaty-makers.'4'
This approach would apply on a treaty-by-treaty basis and hence would not
differentiate on a categorical basis. The problem with this reasoning is that
the objectives and purposes of a treaty are difficult to discern and are often
conflicting. For instance, the stated and unstated goals of tax treaties-the
avoidance of double taxation, the general reduction of taxes, the protection
against tax avoidance, and the prevention of fiscal evasion-may be in conflict
with one another.142 Moreover, even if there is a readily ascertainable single

136. See generally Arato, supra note 2.
137. Although I argue that taxation has a special connection to state sovereignty, I do so in
the context of explaining why tax treaty drafters leave open treaty gaps rather than basing the
methodology on that connection alone. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
Arato, supra note 2, at 2 10.
138.
Id. Arato's statement was made with regard to whether an evolutionary approach to
139.
interpretation is subject-specific, but his conclusion is applicable to the interpretive endeavor generally.
Investment treaties, for instance, may be construed as partially implicating human rights
140.
since they bestow property rights upon individuals. Id. at 211.
See Rosalyn Higgins, Time and the Law: InternationalPerspectiveson an Old Problem, 46 INT'L
141.
& COMP. L.Q. 501,519 (1997) (arguing that the parties' intent, object, and purpose-rather than
subject matter-explain a differential approach to treaty interpretation). My hesitation with this
approach is that, in the tax treaty context, the object and purpose is indeterminate. See infra notes
300-03 and accompanying text.
142.

SeeDriessen, supra note 21, at 747-48.
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purpose, one must also inquire into the parties' intent as to how to achieve
that purpose or what should be sacrificed in order to do so.
More promising avenues look at objective characteristics in validating
interpretive differentiation. Thus, one may consider the reliance interests of
third parties in considering whether to give weight to subsequent practices
and agreements.'43 One may also consider whether a treaty imparts reciprocal
obligations between states, in which case an evolutionary approach may be
justified, or instead attempts to set forth a more lasting commitment, which is
insulated from changes in context or intent. 144
Adding to these latter types of inquiries, I contend that a treaty's degree
of plenitude has implications for the appropriate interpretive methodology.
Certain types of treaties are more comprehensive than others, in which case
reference to extrinsic source is less justifiable. Other treaty categories are
more interstitial and thus require reliance on extrinsic sources.
Comprehensiveness can be defined along two dimensions--degree of
specificity and operationality. As to specificity, some treaties contain openended or vague language, as a matter of necessity and/or to further the
drafters' intent.'45 As to operationality, treaties may contain only provisions
that require other legal sources to have effect.'4 6 Below, I contend that tax
treaties fall far towards the incomplete end of the spectrum on both
dimensions. They lack specificity and are jurisdictional in nature, thus
validating liberal use of extrinsic sources. Because of these characteristics, tax
treaties themselves often direct that interpretive gaps be filled in by the
domestic law.'47

143. See generally Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasionin Investment Treaty Interpretation: The
Dual Role of States, 104 AM.J. INT'L L. 179 (201o).
See generally Arato, supra note 2.
144.
145. For instance, like tax treaties, earlier iterations of bilateral investment treaties contained
vague terms. See Wolfgang Alschner, Interpreting Investment Treaties as Incomplete Contracts:
Lessons from Contract Theory 9-to (July 18, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract-id=2241652 (arguing that first generation bilateral investment treaties are "highly
incomplete" whereas second generation bilateral investment treaties are "complex and
comprehensive"). On the other hand, treaties that represent single transactions between
governments, such as a transfer of land, are more likely to contain specific terminology, thus
justifying a more formalist approach to interpretation. See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 846-48
(arguing for a flexible interpretative approach with regard to treaties that resemble relational
contracts and a more formalist approach with regard to treaties that resemble spot contracts).
146. For instance, procedural treaties, like the Hague Service Convention, typically allow
each signatory to comply with the treaty objectives through flexible use of their own domestic
law, agencies, and processes. They are thus general and non-operative in their approach, much
like tax treaties.
See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art.
147.
3(2) (ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2014); U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF
NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 3 (2) (U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY 2006).
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B. JURISDICTIONAL TAX TREATIES AND THE COMPLEXFI OF TAX LAW

Tax treaties mostly lack operative provisions of law.4 8 Instead, they
function to restrict a state's claim to taxation. To be more precise, tax treaties
limit the reach of the domestic tax laws with respect to international
transactions either by allocating the right to tax to one treaty country or by
requiring foreign tax credits.149 The country that receives the tax claim applies
its domestic taxing rules in conjunction with the principles set forth in the
treaty. Accordingly, a tax treaty does not create a tax obligation that does not
otherwise exist in the domestic law. Thus, the tax rules found in treaties are
more akin to "rules of limitation of law" as seen in "international
administration law" as opposed to rules of conflict seen in private
international law.1so Although they do have a separate legal underpinning,
these "rules of limitation" are "embodied in, or closely related to" the
underlying domestic law of the treaty states. 15
Because of their separate functions, "Code provisions are tailored to
specific situations, whereas treaties state general taxing principles."152
Consequently, treaties often refer to or piggyback upon domestic concepts.s5
Treaties also have a gap-filling provision, based on the OECD Model Treaty's
article 3(2), stating that terms that are not defined by the treaty have the
meaning given to them under the law of the State that is applying the treaty.,54
As will be discussed in further detail below, this is typically the source state but
could also be the residence state.55 The use of domestic law is often
necessitated given that most tax treaties define only a handful of terms., 56
At times, specific treaty provisions dictate that domestic law applies when
defining a term. For instance, "company" under the U.S. Model Treaty is
defined as "any body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate

148.

Tax treaties do contain some operative provisions-specifically, nondiscrimination,

exchange of information, and mutual agreement provisions-but my analysis is limited to the
jurisdictional provisions relating to income. These latter provisions form the backbone of the tax

treaty and are, by far, more likely to present interpretive difficulties.
150.

Vogel, supra note 9, at 14.
Id.

149.
151.

Id.

152.

KLAUs VOGEL ET AL., UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 26 (1989).

153.

Indeed, sometimes treaties deviate from Code terminology simply to correspond with

the foreign text in which the treaty is written. Id.
MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 3 (2)
154.
(ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2014); see also U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF
NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 3(2) (U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY 2006).
See infra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
For instance, the definitions section of both the U.S. and OECD model treaties contain
only ten and eight defined terms, respectively. U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF
NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 3(1); MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON
CAPITAL art. 3(1).
155.
156.
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for tax purposes according to the laws of the state in which it is organized."'57
The determination of residence is a weighty threshold question that tax
treaties have also, by and large, delegated to the domestic law. In determining
whether a person is "residing" in the United States, the treaty first asks
whether that is the case under domestic law. The treaty only steps in to provide
tie-breaking rules when both countries treat the taxpayer as a resident.'s5
Neither do tax treaties define the term "business profits," which
presumably encompasses income derived from any "trade or business"-a
phrase that is in turn defined by the domestic law.'59 Even the definition of
"business expenses," for which the treaty mandates the source country to allow
deductions, 6 o is undefined. Yet, it would be difficult to argue that the absence
of a treaty definition means that the source country cannot impose limitations
that otherwise apply in the domestic context.' 6 ' Thus, a business expense must
likely be "ordinary and necessary" in the U.S. treaty scenario., 62
Tax treaties also invoke domestic law concepts by leaving terms vague or
by providing definitions that themselves employ undefined terms. The
characterization of income is one such area, the outcome of which has a
profound effect on tax liability. Before applying the treaty rules for capital
gains, interest, or dividends, the treaty, having left these terms vague, requires
consultation of domestic law.' 6 s For instance, in the case of interest, the OECD
157.
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2oo6 art. 3(1)(b); see also
MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 3(1) (b).

158.

also U.S.

MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 4(2); see
MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 4(3).

159. The model treaty acknowledges that business profits is left undefined but encompasses
"income derived from any trade or business." TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE U.S.
MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art.

7,1 1 (U.S.

DEP'T OF TREASURY 2006). "Trade or business"

is a technical term of art in the tax world. The Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of
section 162(a) of the Code, a trade or business encompasses those activities that are continuous,
regular, and primarily entered into for profit. This definition has been extended to other
contexts, such as whether income is effectively connected to a trade or business for international
tax purposes. See, e.g., Comm'r. v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27-36 (1987); Free-Pacheco v.
United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 228, 259-60 (2014); Parkv. Comm'r., 136 T.C. 569, 580-81 (201 1),
rev'd and remanded, 722 F-3 d 384 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
16o. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2oo6 art. 7().
161. Townsend, supra note 8, at 266 ("[A] facial reading of the treaty would seem not to
permit the U.S. Code limitations on business expenses, thus giving treaty partners doing business
in the United States a competitive advantage over similarly situated U.S. taxpayers. Nevertheless,
it has never been seriously argued that U.S. Code limitations do not apply in determining the
treaty partner's U.S. [permanent establishment] tax base.").
162.
26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2012) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business.
). Facing a similar query, the IRS released a Technical Advice Memorandum
concluding that section 882(c) (2)'s denial of a deduction to a foreign corporate taxpayer that
failed to file a U.S. tax return did not violate the nondiscrimination provision of the treaty; instead
the provision was merely an administrative provision that was necessary in light of foreign taxpayers
being less discoverable by the Service. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 1999-41-o07 (Oct. 15, 1999).
163.
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 1999-41-007, supra note 162, at 9-1o.
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Model Treaty defines the term as "income from debt-claims of every kind,
whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to
participate in the debtor's profits." 6 4 Of course, this begs the question of what
constitutes a debt-claim, and this may require consultation of domestic law,
even though technically the treaty itself has defined the term.
If both countries characterize the item differently, then the treaty merely
provides for competent authority procedures to attempt to avoid double
taxation. Boulez v. Commissioner, a well known case illustrating this conundrum,
addressed whether the receipt of payments for U.S. performances by a music
conductor residing in Germany constituted royalties, in which case they were
exempt under the U.S.-Germany Treaty and taxable in Germany, or whether
they were compensation for personal services, in which case the payments
were subject to U.S. taxation.' 65 Both countries characterized the payments
differently, and because each country asserted taxing jurisdiction based on
source and residence, article 3(2) could not resolve the conflict.' 66 The Tax
Court held that the income was personal service income under domestic rules
6
and therefore taxable in the United States.1 7

To provide another example of the treaty relying upon domestic law,
under U.S. domestic rules, a foreign person will be taxed on active income in
the United States if they have U.S. source income that is effectively connected
with a U.S. trade or business. 68 Tax treaties narrow this jurisdiction to
business profits that are "attributableto [a] permanent establishment." 69 Some
argue that the "attributable to" treaty standard is essentially equivalent to the
domestic "effectively connected" test.' 70 Even if the two concepts are
independent, they do overlap. Article 5(1) of the 2oo6 Model Treaty defines
a "permanent establishment" as "a fixed place of business through which the
business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on."1'7

U.S. treaties,

however, do not define the term "fixed place of business" and hence the
domestic law largely provides its meaning.=72 Under section 864, certain

164.
MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 11(3)
(ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2014).

165.
166.
167.
168.

Boulez v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 584 (1984).
Id. at 588.
Id. at 596.
26 U.S.C. § 8 7 1(b) (2012).

169.
MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAxEs ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 7 (a)
(emphasis added); see also U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 7(1)
(U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY 2006).
See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Why Do We Need Treaties?, TAX NOTES, Nov. 1g, 2012, at 825, 826;
170.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Oz Halabi, Double or Nothing: A Tax Treaty for the 21st Century 1-2 (Univ. of

Mich. Law Sch. Scholarship Repository, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 66, 2012), http://
repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1176&context=law econcurrent.
171.
172.

U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER

15, 2oo6 art. 5(1).
To be sure, the "permanent establishment" concept, at least as has been interpreted by

the domestic laws of developed countries and the OECD commentaries, disadvantages
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foreign source income of a foreign corporation is taxed if earned through a
domestic office or "fixed place of business."'73 Accordingly, the regulations
under section 864 serve as a gap-filling mechanism for the treaty. The Service
has also stepped in to interpret the term for purposes of the Code and treaties
in revenue rulings,174 recognizing that, in accordance with OECD
commentary, the concept has both a geographic and a temporal element.'75
But why is this gap filling exercise even necessary? Can we notjust assume
the treaty-makers intended "fixed" to mean immobile and permanent? If that
were the case, then a taxpayer's business that is inherently mobile, such as a
logging business or a floating sea facility, would escape taxation.7 6 A seasonal
restaurant operating during the two-year World's Fair would also be exempt
despite the fact such presence is not simply temporary.' 7 7 These results would
seem contrary to the intent of the treaty-makers and to the treaty's purpose,
and yet drafting a treaty to this level of detail would be impractical, particularly
when domestic interpretive sources can be leveraged. The treaty-makers'
choice not to define "fixed place of business" is essentially a choice to
incorporate the domestic meaning of the term-a decision that is quite
common in the tax treaty context. Thus, we are left with instruments that have
"generalized 'treaty speak' that has relatively little connotative value standing
alone."'78
Hence, in addition to the non-substantive nature of tax treaties, we arrive
at another reason for drafting (and interpreting) tax treaties in an incomplete
manner-the complexity of tax law and the astonishing range of fact patterns
to which tax law must apply. Unlike other areas of law, tax law applies to nearly
all economic activities, all individuals, and all business enterprises, each with
different attributes. Tax law does this while also providing critical revenueraising and redistribution functions. Thus, tax law is often complexly drafted.

developing countries by limiting their jurisdiction over source income. That being said,
incorporating domestic law interpretations of the concept may enable developing countries to
prevent the definition of "permanent establishment" from becoming too narrow. See Lee
Sheppard, Beyond Tax Avoidance: Managing Multinationals' Tax and Contractual Relationships
with Developing Countries 28-33 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (presenting
ways in which developed countries can reinterpret or alter permanent establishment clauses to
their advantage).
173.

26 U.S.C.

§

86 4 (c)(

4

)(B), (c)(

5 )(A)

(2012).

174. For example, the Service ruled that an office used by a group of salespeople for
advertising and soliciting orders constituted a fixed place of business under a treaty. Rev. Rul. 6231, 1962-1 C.B. 367.
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 5, ¶ 5 (ORG. FOR
175.
EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2005)See Rev. Rul. 56-165, 1956-1 C.B. 849 (ruling that the demonstration and selling of logging
176.
equipment in several U.S. forests over a two-year period constituted a permanent establishment).
See Rev. Rul. 67-322, 1967-2 C.B. 469 (ruling that such a restaurant constituted a
177.
permanent establishment).

178.

Richard L. Reinhold & Catherine A. Harrington, What NatWest Tells Us About Tax Treaty

Interpretation,TAX NOTES, Apr. 14, 2008, at 169, 203.
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Even so, the treaty, the statute, and even the regulations, cannot anticipate all
the variations of these situations; thus a rich body of interpretive sources
develops to accommodate these limitations.
Some of the literature on the interpretation of domestic tax statutes is
helpful in illustrating the difficulties interpreters face in construing tax
treaties. Much of it focuses on whether the interpretation of tax statutes is
qualitatively different from other areas of law. As Michael Livingston has
discussed, committee reports take on a significant role during the enactment
process of tax legislation due to the conceptual, technical, and complex
nature of such legislation.79 Accordingly, Livingston argues that the
traditional intent-based and process-based objections to legislative history are
not appropriate in the tax context.so
Relevant to the argument here, Livingston argues that the detailed
nature of the Code and its frequent revisions may justify a "contextual
approach to interpretation," rather than a plain meaning approach, when it
is necessary to create consistency within the complex statutory regime.' 8 The
plain meaning approach, he argues, is also inappropriate since the selfcontained nature of tax law creates specialized meanings for tax terms that do
not correspond with their meanings in everyday parlance.1 82 Moreover, the
complexity of tax law means that the text likely does not address the specific
fact pattern at issue and thus reliance upon a variety of different sources is
usuallyjustified. 8 s Indeed, tax legislative history takes on a unique role in that
committee reports typically go beyond explaining a statute and instead
prescribe "an entire range of results that would otherwise be left to
administrative orjudicial discretion."' 84 This legislative dynamic flows directly
from the complexity of tax legislation. 8 5
These observations have interesting implications in the tax treaty context.
If the nature of the tax law requires reliance upon extrinsic interpretive aids
in the domestic context, then the case for nonliteral interpretation should be
179. Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 836-37 (1991). In an empirical project, James
Brudney and Corey Ditslear have demonstrated that the Court historically relied more heavily
upon legislative history and structural canons of interpretation in the tax context than in other
contexts, perhaps due to the recognized expertise of tax committees and the perception of tax
law as a coherent system. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 16.
i8o. Livingston, supra note 179, at 82 2-23.
181. Id. at 827-28.
182.

Id. at 828-29.

183. Id. at 829-30 (observing that, in most tax cases, resort to extrinsic sources is necessary
since Congress will rarely have provided a specific interpretation); see also Lawrence Zelenak,
ThinkingAbout NonliteralInterpretationsofthe InternalRevenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623, 675 (1986)
(arguing that a literal interpretation is justified, even in the face of complexity, if Congress has
identified the specific set of facts in the case). I would contend that the likelihood that the drafters
contemplated a specific set of facts is even less likely in the tax treaty context.
184. Livingston, supra note 179, at 839.
185. Id. at 842.
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even stronger when we interpose a treaty that borrows many of its concepts
from the underlying domestic systems. The detailed nature of the domestic
law means that treaty-makers may be unable to incorporate concepts directly,
thus relying upon the rich array of extrinsic sources to fill in the details.
Specialized meanings of tax terms make trying to ascertain a plain meaning
shared by both treaty partners a difficult task. And, as in the statutory setting,
the treaty will likely not address the factual scenario at issue. Finally, like
legislative history in the domestic context, the technical explanations that
accompany tax treaties, as well as the commentaries on the model treaties, are
often very detailed and address specific factual patterns.
The highly complex demands upon tax law are one reason for the
contemplated gaps in treaty drafting; another is the connection between
taxation and state sovereignty..86 If nations are to retain some control over
this important governmental role, they must build into tax treaties some
degree of ambiguity and reference

to the domestic law.'87 Although

sovereignty enters into most debates over international law, its connection to
tax is particularly strong.88 Taxation implicates the revenue function of a
nation, which is, in turn, the means by which public goods, such as national
defense, are funded.'89 Taxation also is an integral part of the state's fiscal
policy and is employed to affect consumer demand, economic growth, price
stability, and unemployment.Igo Tax treaties restrict a nation's taxing
jurisdiction over foreign persons. Although this foregone revenue may be
186. Townsend, supra note 8, at 267-68 ("[G]iven the dynamics of treaty negotiation,
particularly of tax treaty negotiation implicating one of the most vital governmental functions
(the revenue function), the negotiators must build in some wiggle room that permits the
respective countries to interpret and apply the same provision differently, limited by the overall
parameters of the treaty text."). Lee Sheppard puts this dynamic in a characteristically blunt
fashion: "One of the many glitches . . . is that [tax] treaties are vague documents-deliberately so
in order to encourage countries to sign them." Lee A. Sheppard, Treaty Countries'Right to Use
Domestic Law, TAX NOTEs, Oct. 22, 2012, at 347.
187. One might argue that the last in time rule offers sufficient protection over U.S. tax policy
since a later-enacted statute can override any undesirable treaty results. Global politics and the
realities of the legislative process make such an action unrealistic. First, such overrides violate
international law. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at 339; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax
Treaty Overrides: A Qualified Defence of U.S. Practice, in TAx TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAWA' 65
(Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2006) ("[Overrides] clearly violate[] international law as embodied by
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties."); Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Comm. on
Fiscal Affairs, OECD Committee on FiscalAffairs Report on Tax Treaty Overrides, 2 TAX NOTES INT'L
25, 26-28 (1990). Second, the legislative process has a status quo bias that makes congressional
action difficult, even where legislative preferences support such action taking place. See generally
Rebecca M. Kysar, Automatic Legislation (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
Third, not every country has a last in time rule and thus cannot override treaty obligations
through domestic legislation.
188. See Diane M. Ring, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: InternationalTax and the
Nation-State, 49 VA.J. INT'L L. 155, 157 (2008) (noting the "particular strength to the claims for

tax sovereignty").
189. Id. at 167.
igo. Id. at 168-69.
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offset by the residual taxation that the United States asserts over its own
citizens and residents who pay lower foreign withholding taxes under the
treaty, tax treaties undoubtedly alter the nation's tax policy and mix of
revenues. Moreover, international and domestic tax policies are interrelated;
tax treaties may, for instance, implicate the debate over the proper corporate
tax rate since multinationals receive benefits under these agreements.'91
It is also important to note that taxation differs from the trade context,
where economists claim that the elimination of trade barriers contributes to
not only worldwide efficiency but also to national efficiency. In the
international tax context, no such synergies exist.'9 2 We therefore should
expect a greater degree of retention over national policy in the tax treaty
context. And we do, both implicitly, through ambiguity, and explicitly,
through reference to the domestic tax laws.'93
C.

THE SIMILARITY OF TAX TREATIES

The similarity between individual tax treaties casts further doubt upon
the appropriateness of a plain meaning or intentionalist approach in tax
treaty interpretation. Typically, we think of treaties as pacts between nations
that tailor laws to the specific needs of the signatories. Under this view, the
United States would take into account the particular investment dynamics in
negotiating concessions from different partners. Thus, if the United States is
a capital importer in relation to the treaty partner, it would argue for higher
withholding rates since the revenue on taxing nonresidents on their sourcebased income would outweigh the loss of U.S. residual taxation on its
residents transacting abroad.
Yet despite differences in relative capital flows and the taxing
environments of our treaty partners, tax treaties are quite similar to one
another. '94 Although many countries have their own model treaty, they largely
follow the OECD Model. This is because a nation has to justify any such
departure during treaty negotiations and is required to pay a "price" for its
191.

See Kysar, supra note 28, at 32.
See generally MichaelJ. Graetz, The DavidR TillinghastLecture: TaxingInternationalIncome:
InadequatePrinciples, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001).
193. Of course, this is not to say that cooperation among nations is undesirable in the taxing
context; in fact, tax competition and tax abuse make such cooperation in the national interest.
Some scholars would even go further to suggest a view of sovereignty that demands positive duties
upon nations in exercise of their taxing function. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation
and Social Contract, 18 MINN.J. INT'L L. 99, t1-02 (2009).
194. Related to this observation, there is literature casting doubt upon whether developing
nations should enter into tax treaties as they are currently drafted since their uniformity fails to take
into account the divergent interests of developed and developing nations. Victor Thuronyi, Tax
Treaties and Developing Countries, in TAX TREATIES: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMIcs
441, 450-55 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010) (suggesting a tax treaty for developing nations that
would forgo lowered withholding rates and instead be limited to exchange of information,
administrative cooperation, nondiscrimination, tie-breaker rules, and mutual agreements); see also
Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 939,991 (2000).
192.
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inclusion.'95 Another scholar has concluded that the OECD Model Tax Treaty
has such an influence on tax treaties that "[o] ne can pick up any modern tax
treaty and immediately find one's way around, often even down to the article
number.".96 Although the treaties are individually negotiated, the
negotiations produce fewer deviations than one might expect.'97 Effectively,
the OECD Model has spawned a single multilateral regime, albeit comprised
of numerous treaties.'9 8
What does the similarity among tax treaties mean for their
interpretation? First, because the treaties look less like individually negotiated
contracts, limiting interpretation to the treaty text and negotiating materials
seems less relevant. Second, a rich array of extrinsic sources is available to
interpret the nearly uniform set of treaty principles.
D.

TAxABUSE

The reality of tax abuse requires non-treaty based solutions and hence
also contributes to the interstitial nature of tax treaties. Combatting tax abuse
is a major goal of domestic tax systems worldwide. To some extent, treaties
further these goals through the use of information sharing provisions. In
other respects, treaties enable, or at least fail to prevent, tax avoidance. The
discussion below provides examples of tax abuse involving treaties and argues
that invocation of domestic anti-abuse doctrines and administrative
interpretations is necessary for each.
1.

Illustrations of Treaty Abuse

Residents of a non-treaty country may inappropriately invoke a treaty, a
phenomenon known as treaty shopping. For instance, such residents may
organize an entity in a treaty country without having economic ties to the
treaty country in order to take advantage of the lower treaty withholding rate.
Because the intention of the bilateral treaty structure is to provide reciprocal
benefits to the residents of the two treaty countries and not to residents of a

195. Michael Long, Tax Treaty Policy, in NATIONAL TAX POLICY IN EUROPE: To BE OR NOT TO
BE? 191, 206 (Krister Andersson et al. eds., 2007).
196. John F. Avery Jones, The David R TillinghastLecture: Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX
L. REV. 1, 2 (1999).
Differences, of course, exist between tax treaties. See generally ii DEPARTURES FROM THE
197.
OECD MODEL AND COMMENTARIES: RESERVATIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND POSITIONS IN EU LAW AND
TAX TREATIES (EC & Int'l Tax Law Series, Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2014). Variances among the
treaties, however, are vastly overshadowed by their similarities. SeeFEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 3-4 (AM. LAw INST. 1987); Yariv
Brauner, An InternationalTax Regime in Crystallization,56 TAX L. REV. 259, 291 (2003) (discussing
"the (almost) consensus about the impressive extent of similarity and even unity within the
multitude of tax treaties").
198.
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 16g (2000) (discussing the
existence of an international tax regime which "rests mainly on the bilateral tax treaty network"

and "which has definable principles that underlie it and are common to the treaties").
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third country, treaties contain rules, known as limitation on benefits
provisions, mandating some economic nexus to the treaty countries before
treaty benefits can be utilized. 99
Various other taxpayer abuses involve the avoidance of treaty limitations.
For instance, treaties often contain a 12-month permanent establishment
threshold for construction projects.2o Taxpayers may try to get around this
rule by dividing their contracts into short-term periods, attributing each to a
related company. 20 ' The hiring out of foreign labor by an intermediary to
obtain the benefit of exemption from source country taxation on
compensation is another abuse.02 Taxpayers may also attempt to alter the
characterization of income in order to obtain a favorable treaty result.2o3

Taxpayers also use tax treaties to avoid domestic taxation. Such abuses
may include financing transactions that reduce the costs of borrowing
through tax deductions; strategies involving arbitrage between the residency
rules for the domestic system and the treaty; transfer pricing abuse;
transactions that arbitrage the differences found in the domestic law of one
or both treaty countries related to the characterization of income, the
treatment of taxpayers, or timing differences; and transactions that abuse
relief of double taxation mechanisms to achieve non-taxation in both states
(double non-taxation) .204
2.

Measures to Combat Treaty Abuse

Strategies to reduce treaty abuse take several different forms, and I argue
here that resort to domestic anti-abuse laws and doctrines is necessary because
a comprehensive treaty-based solution is impractical. The many opportunities
for abuse of the treaty system and those created by it again reinforce the
characterization of tax treaties as incomplete devices, thus requiring resort to
extrinsic sources. Among these sources are legislative or administrative rules
curtailing specific abusive situations and also the U.S. common law doctrines

199.
See, e.g., U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2oo6 art. 22 (U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY 2oo6).
200.
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 5(3); see also MODEL
CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 5(3) (ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEv. 2014).

201.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS
IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6: 2015 FINAL REPORT 69 (2015), http://www.keep
eek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-ininappropriate-circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report-978926 4 2 4 1 695-en#page 1.
202.

Id.

203.
For instance, a shareholder may enter into a transaction to avoid dividend
characterization under domestic rules, thereby allowing treaty exemption as a capital gain. Comm.
of Experts on Int'l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping, at 17-18, U.N.
Doc. E/C.18/2006/2 (Oct. 3o-Nov. 3, 2006). Taxpayers may also convert dividends to interest in
order to take advantage of a lower withholding tax (or complete exemption) on interest. Id. at 18.
204.

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 201, at 78.
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such as economic substance, substance over form, the sham transaction
doctrine, and the step transaction doctrine.05 The economic substance
doctrine has perhaps been the most influential, requiring that tax benefits
not be extended to transactions that lack non-tax purposes and economic
consequences.
In some instances of treaty abuse, the treaty could arguably be changed
to close its loopholes. And indeed many treaties have evolved to provide for
rules aimed at specific anti-abuse situations. For instance, the limitation on
benefits rules require some nexus to the treaty countries before a taxpayer
can invoke the treaty.2o6 Yet in a pattern familiar to tax professionals, the
creativity of taxpayers ensures that the current rules will be evaded through
new transaction forms. Indeed, because of this issue, the OECD and G2o have
recently recommended through the BEPS Project that, in addition to
revamped limitation on benefits rules and other specific anti-abuse
limitations, treaties include a general anti-abuse rule that would disregard
treaty benefits where one of the principal purposes of the transaction was to
obtain such benefits. o7
Going forward, the United States and other countries would be wise to
close loopholes and include anti-abuse rules in its treaties. At least in certain
abusive contexts, there is some international support for doing so. Yet altering
the vast network of existing treaties in a timely manner will not be easy as a
practical matter. Currently, there is a BEPS proposal for a multilateral treaty
that may have the capacity to update existing treaties automatically, in which
case this task may become easier.2os The details and scope of the project,
however, have not yet been determined and participation by countries is
optional. Also, participating members may be able to opt in and out of certain
updates.209 Even if nations incorporated the general anti-abuse rule into
existing treaties, either individually or through the multilateral treaty, judicial
resort to the common law doctrines would be essential to understanding the
scope of any such rule given its necessarily fact-intensive application.

205.

The judicial anti-abuse doctrines often overlap and apply concurrently. The economic

substance doctrine requires that a transaction have economic purpose, apart from tax savings, in

order to be respected. See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3 d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2006). The substance over form doctrine prescribes the tax consequences that flow from the

economics of the transaction rather than its formalities. See BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523
F-3 d 461, 471 ( 4 th Cir. 2008). The sham transaction doctrine ignores transactions that have no
economic consequences other than tax benefits. See Kirchman v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486, 1490

(1 1 th Cir. 1989). Finally, the step transaction doctrine integrates the steps of various transactions,
basing the tax liability on a single event. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935).
See, e.g., U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 22 (U.S.
206.
DEP'T OF TREASURY 2006).
207.

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 201, at 55.
208.
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DEVELOPING A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT
To MODIFY BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, ACTION 15: 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015).
209.

Id. at 42.
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Several courts have indeed invoked anti-abuse doctrines to deny
taxpayers their anticipated tax results. For instance, in a recent case, Bank of
New York Mellon Corp. v. Commissioner, a taxpayer engaged in a complex tax
shelter and reported income from trust assets as foreign source income based
on a resourcing provision in the U.S.-U.K Income Tax Treaty.-o The court
disregarded the transaction, which involved circular cash flows, and therefore
resourced the income as domestic, effectively ignoring the treaty language.In so doing, the court relied upon the judicial economic substance doctrine
as well as its codification by Congress in section 7701.212
In a leading case on limitation on benefits, Aiken Industries v.
Commissioner, the court held that a transaction using back-to-back loans among
related taxpayers lacked a business purpose and therefore that a treaty
exemption did not apply to interest payments."a In another case involving
limitation on benefits, the court invoked the step transaction doctrine to
disregard the receipt of interest payments that were exempt under a treaty."4
Congress's recent codification of the economic substance doctrine arguably
gives courts more authority to employ the doctrine in domestic and treaty
contexts."5
The justification for relying upon broad anti-abuse rules to curb treaty
abuse is similar to thejustification for relying upon such rules in the domestic
context. Anti-abuse rules displace certainty, yet without them the tax base
would be eroded. Long ago, Stanley Surrey wrote: "It is clear that [anti-abuse
provisions] save the tax system from the far greater proliferation of detail that
would be necessary if the tax avoider could succeed merely by bringing his
scheme within the literal language of substantive provisions written to govern
21o.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm'r, 140 T.C. 15, 16-17 (2013).
Id. at 4 8.
212.
Id. at 30-35, 48.
213. Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 925, 933-35 (1971).
214.
Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F. 3 d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2001); See also
Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 80g, 813 ( 5 th Cir. 1964); Gaw v. Comm'r, 7oT.C.M. (CCH)
i196 (1995). In the 99os, taxpayers engaged in "dividends stripping" transactions that were
asserted to have no pretax profit but generated after-tax profit through foreign tax credits. In two
well known opinions, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits reversed trial courts' summaryjudgments for
the United States, holding that the transactions did not lack business purpose or economic
substance. Notably, however, the courts did not rely upon the argument that the transactions
involved treaties that, by their plain language, required the United States to allow the foreign tax
credit, nor did the taxpayers assert such arguments. Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F. 3 d
778, 788 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3 d 350, 356 (8th Cir. 2oo1).
215.
See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(0) (2012); Erik M.Jensen, Legislative and Regulatory Responses to Tax
Avoidance: Explicating and Evaluatingthe Alternatives, 57 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 1, 30-31 (2012) ("[F] or
judges unsure about their authority to apply extra-statutory principles, codification of economic
substance makes the extra-statutory statutory, and, for those judges unsympathetic to government
arguments, codification obligates them to take economic substance seriously."); Bret Wells,
Economic Substance Doctrine: How Codification Changes Decided Cases, FLA. TAX REV., 2010, at 411,
418 (" [I] t can be inferred that Congress believed that the codification of the economic substance
doctrine would further enhance the successful application of this doctrine.").
211.
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the everyday world."1 6 Closing individual loopholes through treaty text is a
similarly futile and resource-demanding task, one in which the taxpayer is
always one step ahead.17
Although the incorporation of anti-abuse rules is in tension with the plain
language approach blessed by the Vienna Convention, similar accusations
have been rejected in the purely domestic context. Specifically, the departure
from a strictly textualist approach to combat abusive tax shelters has been
largely accepted by American academic literature and the judiciary as
necessary to defend the Code against tax avoidance. Noel Cunningham and
James Repetti emphasized the connection between the rise of textualism and
the proliferation of such shelters.- 8 Indeed, the Court itself seems to have
shied away from a textualist approach in tax cases after a brief
experimentation.19 Furthermore, the failure of British and Canadian courts
to look beyond a statute's text except in limited circumstances has resulted in
an inability to develop robust judicial anti-avoidance doctrines and has
arguably contributed to the growth of such shelters within those systems. 2 o

216. Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the InternalRevenue Code: The Problem of the Management
of Tax Detail, 34 IAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 707 n.31 (1969); see also David A. Weisbach,
Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 86o, 862 (1999) (arguing that anti-abuse rules
preserve simplicity in the Code).
Specific rules are often formalistic. Their objective criteria can be easily evaded by
217.
taxpayers. See Anna A. Kornikova, Comment, Solving the Problem of Tax-Treaty Shopping Through the
Use ofLimitation on Benefits Provisions, 8 RICH.J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 264-65 (2oo8) (discussing
bright-line anti-abuse rules as being easily circumvented by taxpayers in the context of treaty
shopping). Moreover, addressing individual loopholes often results in taxpayers simply finding
another. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Searchfor a
SilverBullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939,1950 (2005) ("It is always possible, of course, to shut down
particular shelter techniques with narrowly-targeted legislation .... The problem is that these
targeted fixes are always made prospective only. As Congress closes one loophole, tax shelter
designers find other glitches in the Code around which to build new shelters.").
218.
See generally Noel B. Cunningham &James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA.
TAx REV. 1 (2004). Larry Solan and Steven Dean argue that neither textualism nor intentionalism
provides the means to combat abusive tax shelters since such shelters either fall within statutory
language or take advantage of gaps in statutory language where legislative intent cannot be
discerned. Steven A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: NavigatingBetween Text
and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879, 88o, 889 (2007). Instead, they argue, anti-abuse doctrines, such
as the business purpose doctrine, are effective because they allow judges to be attentive towards
legislative purpose while still considering statutory language. Id. at 903-04.
219.
Lawrence Zelenak, The Court and the Code: A Response to The Warp and Woof of Statutory
Interpretation, 58 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1788-89 (2009).
220.
Cunningham & Repetti, supranote 218, at 27; see also Brian J. Arnold, Reflections on the
Relationship Between Statutory Interpretation and Tax Avoidance, 49 CANADIAN TAX J. 1, 2, 13-19
(2001) (suggesting that a literalist approach by Canadian courts has led the Supreme Court of
Canada to uphold "several blatant tax avoidance schemes"). Although the 1982 Ramsay case
seemed to signal the development of ajudicial anti-abuse doctrine in the U.K., it did not bear
fruit. Judith Freedman, InterpretingTax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention ofParliament, 123
LAw Q. REV. 53, 58 (2007); see also ROY RoHATGI, BASIC INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 31 (2002)
(describing the domestic approach to statutory interpretation as literal in many countries). It
could, however, be argued that the Article's prescription to look to extrinsic sources in
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'

My argument here is that, in interpreting treaties, taxpayer abuse
necessitates that courts have the authority to rely upon both general and
specific domestic rules aimed at abuse, including those administered at the
agency level, as well as domestically refined judicial doctrines. Tax treaties
function as limits upon the substantive provisions of the domestic law. The
determination of true economic substance and hence the assessment of a tax
liability is a necessary predicate to the application of a treaty, and therefore
there is arguably no conflict between anti-abuse files and the treaty.22
Additionally, it could be contended that tax anti-abuse rules have even been
elevated to the status of international law.222 In addition to the OECD and
G2o's recent acceptance of such rules in the tax treaty context,22 3 the
International Court of Justice has applied an anti-abuse concept in
interpreting other types of treaties, the Vienna Convention incorporates a
good faith requirement, and numerous countries have developed anti-abuse
doctrines of their own. 4
22

E.

TYPEs oFExTRINsicSOURCES

This Article has argued that tax treaties are unsuited to interpretation as
standalone vehicles; instead, their incomplete and uniform nature, the
technicality of the tax system, and the reality of tax abuse require reliance on
extrinsic sources, including ones outside of the negotiating process. This
Subpart further discusses the types of extrinsic sources that are appropriate
in the interpretive endeavor.
1.

Domestic Law

After accounting for the interstitial nature of treaties, one must
determine which country's laws should govern when domestic law is
implicated. Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Treaty provides that the
undefined term "shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the

interpreting tax treaties may actually abet tax abuse since such sources may include textualist
judicial opinions. Such courts adhering to textualist precedent, however, would most likely be
hostile to my approach anyway. I therefore do not think that the prescribed methodology would
exacerbate the problem unless it led to the spread of textualism to other interpretive bodies.
Because I recommend the incorporation of a multitude of extrinsic source, the chances of such
an interpreter focusing solely on a textualist source are low. If anything, my prescribed
methodology should encourage courts and other bodies reluctant to consider extrinsic sources
on the basis of international norms or law to reconsider their textualist leanings.
221.
See generally Comm. of Experts on Int'l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Treaty Abuse and
Treaty Shopping, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2006/2 (Oct. 30-Nov. 3, 2oo6).
222.
SeeVOGELETAL., supra note 9, para. 121, at 56 (concluding that tax treaties "are subject
to a general 'substance v. form proviso' based on international law").
223. ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supranote 201, at 54-55 (adopting a test that
disregards treaty benefits where one of the principal purposes of the transaction was to obtain
such benefits).
224.

Ward, supra note 9, at 403.
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meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes
of the taxes to which the Convention applies."225 The U.S. Model Treaty
employs a similar rule.22 6 Some have interpreted this provision to require

incorporation of the source state's laws since it is only that state's laws that
technically "apply."227
Although it is correct that it is typically the source state whose laws are at
issue, in meeting the duty to alleviate double taxation, the residence country
must apply its own domestic foreign tax credit rules. The residence
jurisdiction should thus be able to apply its own foreign tax credit limitations,
and even its own characterization rules, to determine whether the source
jurisdiction should have taxed the item.22 8 I believe this is the better reading
of the "applies" language in article 3(2). Thus, article 3(2) of the Model Tax
Treaties, by incorporating domestic law concepts, necessarily "accepts double
taxation as a result."229 This result is not inappropriate given the "pragmatic
consideration that the authorities and the courts quite naturally understand
their own law best."23o Additionally, relying primarily on the interpreting
countries' resources ensures that taxpayers need only analyze a more limited
world of interpretive principles and domestic laws.s1
Also at issue is to what extent the domestic law should be used in
interpreting tax treaties. The treaties themselves, as generally set forth in
article 3(2) of the U.S. and OECD Model Treaties, command that the
domestic law be employed whenever the term is left undefined "unless the
context otherwise requires."232 Some have taken the position that domestic

law should only be used as a last resort.3s Klaus Vogel, on the other hand,
argues that the "requires" language in article 3(2) mandates use of the
domestic law unless there exists a strong argument not to do so. 2 34 Still others

225.
MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 3(2)
(ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2014).
226.
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 3(2) (U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY 2006).
227.

AveryJones et al., supra note 9, at 25-48.

228.
See Vogel, supra note 9, at 7; Klaus Vogel & Rainer G. Prokisch, General Report, in
LXXVIIIa CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL: INTERPRETATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTIONS 55, 77-79 (Int'l Fiscal Ass'n ed., 1993).
229. Vogel, supranote 9, at 74.
230. Id. at 63.
231. See Smith, supra note 8, at 863.
232. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 3(2) (U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY 2006) ("[Alny term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise
requires, or the competent authorities agree to a common meaning pursuant to the provisions
of Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure), have the meaning which it has at that time under
the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies.").
233. See Avery Jones et al., supra note 9, at 1o5 (noting that a number of courts and scholars
have taken this position).
234.
VOGEL ET AL., supra note 9, at 139-42; see also Avery Jones et al., supra note 9, at io8
("The context must therefore be reasonably strong for the internal law meaning to be ousted.").
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contend that "given the general and noncomprehensive nature of tax
treaties," the "unless the context otherwise requires" language simply directs
"the interpreter to render the most appropriate meaning." 235
In Samann v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals interpreted a provision
in the U.S.-Switzerland treaty that exempted royalties of taxpayers not having
a permanent establishment in the United States.236 The court held that the
taxpayer could not have a permanent establishment "at any time during the
taxable year" because of a similar concept in the Code, which Treasury had
incorporated into regulations.237 The court reasoned that the gap-filling

provision for undefined terms in the treaty is indicative of the "signatories'
desire to retain their own scheme of taxation."23 8 Article 3(2) does seem to
suggest an effort to coordinate the tax treaty with the internal tax systems of
the signatories. It therefore seems straightforward to agree with Vogel in
concluding that this provision commands the interpreter to draw upon
internal law to define an undefined term unless an interpretation can be
found by other particularly convincing means.
But this does not end the inquiry; the generalist nature of treaties
requires further use of domestic law. It may also be necessary to consult
domestic law when the definition provided by the treaty is not sufficiently
detailed or itself has undefined terms. Reference to the domestic law may also
be appropriate when an undefined concept is analogous to, but worded
differently than, a domestic concept. Finally, treaties often specifically defer
to the state's definition of a term, such as is the case with residency and real
property.239
A further question arises as to whether the interpreter should apply the
domestic law at the time the treaty was executed (a static approach) or instead
apply current law (an ambulatory approach).W4o U.S. courts generally follow
the ambulatory approach, 24 and the OECD commentaries have also endorsed

235.
236.
237.
238.

See Smith, supra note 8, at 882.
Samann v. Comm'r, 313 F.2d. 461 ( 4 th Cir. 1963).

Id. at 464.
Id. at 463.

239.
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAx CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15,
DEP'T OF TREASURY 2006).

2oo6 art.

4(1), 6(2) (U.S.

240. These concepts are illustrated in Revenue Ruling 56-446, which characterized the
distribution from a pension fund for purposes of an older U.S--Canada tax treaty that, as most
treaties do, exempted gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets. Under domestic law at
the time of the treaty's effective date, such proceeds were ordinary income; however, Congress
later changed the treatment to be capital gains. The ruling followed current law, characterizing
the proceeds as capital gains and hence granted exemption under the treaty. Rev. Rul. 56-446,
1956-2 C.B. 1065, modified by Rev. Rul. 58-247, 1958-1 C.B. 623.
See, e.g., United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 15-17 (ad Cir. 1975); Crow v.
241.
Comm'r, 85 T.C. 376, 395 (1985); Estate of Burghardt v. Comm'r, 8o T.C. 705, 717 (1983), affd
sub nom., Estate of Burghardtv. Comm'r, 734 F.2d 3 ( 3 d Cir. 1984); Rev. Rul. 80-243, 1980-2 C.B.
413; Rev. Rul. 56-446, 1956-2 C.B. 1065; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-26-o5 (Mar. 8, 1985); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,373 (June 24, 1985); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,978 (June 15, 1979).
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looking to current law.42 An ambulatory approach is preferable for several
reasons. Most importantly, updated domestic rules are necessary to fill the
treaty's gaps because of the need not only to combat tax abuse but to grow
with a changing global economy. For instance, treaties were written before
the digital economy. Does doing business on network servers located in the
United States constitute a permanent establishment? It is impractical to draft
treaties anticipating future events but also to renegotiate treaties for every
necessary update.
An ambulatory approach also somewhat mitigates the worrisome
phenomenon that occurs when the vast network of bilateral tax treaties locks
in domestic policy243 Moreover, taxpayers and courts may find it burdensome
to apply outdated concepts and terms. Also, because it is the approach favored
by the OECD, and one that is naturally contemplated given the interstitial
nature of tax treaties, one can presume that it represents the intent of many
contracting nations. A static approach might also contribute to double
taxation because "the treaty would have no relevance to the new rule."244 That
is, if tax treaties lack a mechanism to remain current, harmonization of the
treaty partners' laws will be short-lived. Finally, the obligations set forth in tax
treaties are reciprocal in nature, "reflecting mere exchanges of rights and
duties between parties," rather than absolute duties that are "resilient against
shifts in party intention."45 Accordingly, they are more amenable to an
ambulatory interpretive approach.246
It could be argued that a new multilateral instrument updating the
existing network of bilateral treaties, as mentioned above, diminishes the
need for dynamic interpretation (and perhaps reliance on extrinsic materials
in general). Aside from the implementation questions of such an instrument,
which I have discussed,247 a multilateral instrument will not be able to
comprehensively address the constant need to renovate treaties in light of
changing circumstances. Indeed, the very proposal of such a radical
instrument highlights the dramatic need for a fluid approach to
interpretation, and the introduction of new changes to the treaty system

242.
COMMENTARIES ON THE ARTICLES OF THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION art. 3 (2) cmt. 13, 13.1
(ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 20io), http://www.oecd.org/berlin/publikationen/

The OECD's embrace of ambulatory interpretation was heavily influenced by
2
AveryJones. See generally Avery Jones etal., supra note 9.
243. Avery Jones, supra note 196, at 4 ("Treaties cannot be changed because there are so
many of them and so the OECD tends to rewrite the Commentary instead of the Model Treaty,
leading to problems that I consider later. And treaties inhibit changes in internal law, which
would have no effect in cases where treaties exist, that is to say, in most of the cases that matter.
This leads to either the changes not happening or to treaty override.").
244. Smith, supranote 8, at 883.
Arato, supra note 2, at 2 18-19.
245.
246. See id.
247. See supra notes 208-o9 and accompanying text.
4 3 3 4 4 6 5 .pdf.
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through the multilateral instrument will make dynamic interpretation even
more important.
Somewhat relatedly, new draft U.S. Model Treaty provisions may signify
a trend towards dynamic interpretation built into the treaties themselves. Two
new provisions that target double non-taxation hinge directly on evolving
domestic law. The first denies treaty withholding rates on investment income
to taxpayers eligible for "special tax regimes" that are introduced by the treaty
partner subsequent to the treaty signing.24 8 The second turns off the treaty

withholding rates for all taxpayers if a treaty country reduces its tax rate on
investment income below 15% or shifts to a territorial regime.249 The U.S.
Model Treaty is heavily influential given the United States' importance in the
markets and thus these types of provisions may very well impact the treaty
policies of other nations.2so Treasury officials have even stated that the new
model treaty provisions were intended to influence the OECD and its BEPS
project.=5, As with the introduction of the multilateral instrument, the
evolutive character built into these provisions will almost certainly require
reference to dynamic, domestic law sources in the interpretive process.
2.

Senate Materials

As discussed above,5z there are constitutional arguments for considering
the Senate's views, and even the late Justice Scalia signed on to a post-Stuart
opinion that relies upon Senate hearings in its treaty interpretation.53 Apart
from constitutional considerations, however, should courts rely upon Senate
materials? Although such materials are unilateral, they generally represent an
informed view of one of the treaty partners and thus are legitimate
interpretive aids. Additionally, in the tax treaty context, the Senate reports are
reflective of the technical expertise brought to bear by Treasury. Of course,
such materials present dangers similar to those in the statutory context. For
this reason, more weight should be given to those materials that best represent
the views of the chamber, such as committee reports, and less weight to Senate
materials that may represent the opinions of a lone Senator, such as floor
statements.

SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION: NEW ARTICLE
248.
3 PARAGRAPH 1 (i) DEFINITION OF "SPECIAL TAX REGIME" (U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY 2015), https://

www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Special-Tax-Regimes5-20-2015.pdf.
249.
SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION: NEW ARTICLE
28 (SUBSEQUENT CHANGES IN LAw) (U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/

resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Subsequent-Changes-in-Law-5-2o-2015.pdf.
250. Allison Christians, Seeing STRs: A New Vision for Tax Treaties?, 41 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
Id.
251.
252.

253.

See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,499-500 (2008).
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Executive Materials

In addition to the constitutional arguments for reliance upon Executive
materials, the expertise upon which they draw makes the case for using them
in the treaty context stronger. Administrative materials, however, range in
usefulness. Courts generally give significant weight to executive branch
interpretations of U.S. treaties, although, as illustrated in the discussion of the
case law above, this does not mean that an agency's interpretation always
carries the day.54 Indeed, administrative interpretations may be given less
weight in the treaty context because the interests of the U.S. government are
adverse to that of the other treaty state. This differs from the domestic context
where the interests of the executive branch and Congress are aligned.255
The Treasury's Technical Explanation of the model treaty and each
individual treaty is an integral part of the materials considered by the Senate
in providing its advice and consent. Although Technical Explanations are
almost never agreed to by the treaty party, they are sometimes transmitted to
them and known to the other party in advance.25 6 Their importance in the
enactment process and in the interpretive endeavor is well known in other
jurisdictions. Although they likely do not have formal legal status that would
entitle them to deference under administrative law principles,257 they are
properly consulted as evidence of one treaty partner's interpretation of the
statute (or even both if the partner did not negotiate a deviation from a
known interpretation).
The IRS rarely issues Treasury regulations interpreting tax treaties, but
in the domestic context, properly promulgated Treasury regulations are
entitled to Chevron deference.251 Informal guidance such as revenue rulings
and revenue procedures are much more common in the treaty context. They
also may be entitled to deference, although what type of deference is in flux,
particularly in light of recent Supreme Court case law.59
Lowest on the hierarchy are revenue rulings or other administrative
pronouncements made in the course of litigation. In the statutory context,
the Court has precluded Chevron deference for an agency's litigation position.
However, the question of whether such a position, manifested in amicus briefs
or revenue rulings, receives Skidmore deference is the subject of a circuit
split.so It may be problematic to rely on such guidance given that the

254.

255.

See supranotes 117-29 and accompanying text.
See William W. Chip, InterpretingTax Treaties After NatWest, 37 TAx MGMT. INT'LJ. 321,

330 (2008).

256. Smith, supra note 8, at 888-8g n.206.
257. Kirsch, supra note 8, at 1095-97.
258. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53-58 (2011).
259. Id. at 55-58.
260. See Bradley George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory InterpretationsFirst
Advanced in Litigation?The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, So U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 448
(2013).
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incentive effects that occur at the litigation stage have the potential to be more
self-serving than those at the interpretive stage.2 61 The interpretation also
might represent the views of agency counsel rather than the views of the
agency itself, it might have been developed without expertise and under time
pressure, and there may have been no opportunity to consider differing
viewpoints and evidence. 62 Such retroactive guidance may also take the
taxpayer by surprise. Of course, a court could still choose to apply Skidmore
deference after applying these considerations to the specific factual
scenario.

6

2 3

Another question arises as to whether a later treaty reinterpretation by
the executive branch should take precedence over an interpretation upon
which the Senate relied in providing its advice and consent. This issue resulted
in intense debate between the two branches when President Reagan
reinterpreted the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In reaction to the President's
interpretation of the treaty, the Senate adopted the "Biden Condition" for all
subsequent treaties, which stated that the treaty would be interpreted based
on the shared views of the President and the Senate during the advice and
consent stage.2 6 4 In response, the State Department pronounced that the
President was not bound to prior interpretations, citing the important role
6
given to the President by the Treaty Clause.2 5 In later litigation involving the
treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stood its ground, and the
executive branch appeared to retreat from its earlier position. 66
The point here is not to decide these complex questions involving deep
ambiguities within administrative and constitutional law doctrine but is
instead to present a general overview of materials upon which courts may rely

Id.at 4 71-72.
See id.
263. See Leandra Lederman, The Fight over "FightingRegs" and Judicial Deference in Tax
Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REv. 643, 644, 648 (2012) (proposing that the court take into account
retroactivity and surprise issues in analyzing the effects of regulations and revenue rulings issued
in the course of litigation).
264. See 134 CONG. REC. 12,844-49 (1988).
The ABM Treaty and the Constitution:Joint Hearings Before the S. Comm. on ForeignRelations
265.
& the S. Comm. on the judiciary, iooth Cong. 177 (1987) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden, Jr.,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). Scholarly articles on this debate are numerous. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Glennon, Essay, Interpreting "Interpretation":The President, the Senate, and When Treaty
InterpretationBecomes Treaty Making, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 913 (1987); Malvina Halberstam, A
Treaty Is a Treaty is a Treaty, 33 VA.J. INT'LL. 51 (1992); David A. Koplow, ConstitutionalBait and
Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353 (1989); Eugene
V. Rostow, The ReinterpretationDebate and ConstitutionalLaw, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1451 (1989); Gary
Michael Buechler, Note, ConstitutionalLimits on the President'sPowerto Interpret Treaties: The Sofaer
Doctrine, the Biden Condition, and the Doctrine of Binding Authoritative Representations, 78 GEO. L.J.
1983 (1990); and W. Michael Reisman, Comment, Necessary and Proper: Executive Competence to
Interpret Treaties, 15 YALEJ. INT'L L. 316 (199o).
266. Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, 699 F. Supp. 339, 343 (D.D.C. 1988)
(quoting the Government's position in litigation briefs), rev'd, 911 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 199o).
261.
262.
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in the treaty interpretation process. Generally speaking, my approach does
not differ from that of the Court's in that I conclude that administrative
materials are entitled to significant weight when created outside of the course
of litigation..67 This conclusion is partially based on the traditional deference
afforded the executive branch over foreign affairs and in administrative law
generally, but, as discussed above, flows also from the incomplete nature of
tax treaties, the related need to keep the international tax system abreast with
a changing global economy, and the associated necessity of staving off tax
abuse.
4.

International Materials

I have thus far emphasized domestic materials as aids of interpretation,
but I do not mean to foreclose the use of extrinsic international materials. In
particular, the OECD commentaries should be tapped as extremely important
gap filling mechanisms.2 6

8

They are written by representatives of OECD

nations, including the United States, and are binding upon OECD states to
the extent reservations are not entered. Thus, they represent the specific
intent of OECD members. Klaus Vogel has even argued that, because the
commentaries are well known and easily obtainable, they have a status above
that of preparatory work and thus courts need not invoke the exceptions to
the plain meaning rule of the Vienna Convention to consult them.2 69
Although Vogel's reasoning, in the technological age, could extend to
insulate many types of extrinsic materials from the plain meaning rule, Vogel
correctly notes that awareness of the commentaries, both specific and general,
gives them legitimacy as tools of interpretation.27o The treaties themselves are
based heavily on the OECD Model, which is itself a skeletal document, making
reference to the official interpretations of the model vital. That being said, if
a member country enters reservations with regard to a particular commentary

267. See, e.g., United States v. Stuart,489 U.S. 353, 369 (989) (noting that executive branch
materials are entitled to "great weight"); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,
184-85 (1982) (same); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.

§ 326(2) (AM. LAw INST. 1986) ("Courts ...

will give great weight to an interpretation made by

the Executive Branch.").

268.

A difficult question arises as to reliance upon the commentaries by developing nations.

As Lee Sheppard recently has noted, such commentaries disadvantage source countries. See
generally Sheppard, supra note 172. Care should be exercised in interpreting treaties with
developing nations, paying particular attention to such nations' reservations to the commentaries.
Developing countries may also, in interpreting the treaties, wish to consult the relatively developed
interpretations by large developing countries such as India. See Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Use and

Interpretationof Tax Treaties in the Emerging World: Theory and Implications, 4 BRIT. TAX REV. 352, 390
(2oo8) (arguing that the standards-based approach of OECD Model Tax Treaties allows
developing nation's considerable flexibility in interpreting treaties that they will use to generally
benefit the taxpayer due to the necessity of competing with other developing nations).
269. Vogel, supra note 9, at 40.
27o.
For this reason, considerably less deference to the commentaries is warranted in tax
treaties with non-OECD countries. Id. at 42.
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(such reservations are recorded in the commentaries themselves), then the
reservation is relevant for interpretative purposes.
The commentaries are designed to be ambulatory in nature. They
themselves recommend applying the most current commentaries,271 and
there is some support in the Vienna Convention for so doing since article 31
allows reference to subsequent agreements and practice.272 Additionally, an
ambulatory approach assists to modernize an aging legal infrastructure, to
adjust the treaties to new policies, and to guard against tax abuse. For these
reasons, U.S. courts, as well as courts in other countries, have embraced the
ambulatory approach.273 Indeed, it may be that nations follow the OECD
Model so closely in drafting their own treaties precisely because they want to
take advantage of the opportunity for ambulatory construction provided by
the commentaries. Even certain countries that have explicitly rejected the
ambulatory approach have later embraced it "simply to cope with the
difficulty of some treaty interpretation questions that arise."274
Outside of the commentaries, there are many other international sources
available. First, if a domestic court construes a treaty provision, the
interpretation may be persuasive even in cases involving other treaties with
the shared language.275 A domestic court may also find relevant other
6
countries' interpretations of the treaty at issue or even parallel treaties.27
Subsequent practices by the treaty partners, such as diplomatic
communications regarding a treaty interpretation or even silent acquiescence
to a unilateral interpretation,77 are also widely accepted extrinsic sources and
specifically condoned by the Vienna Convention. Finally, the Vienna
Convention also allows use of the negotiating history, although such material
8
is usually limited in the case of bilateral treaties.27

271.
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL,
(ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2010).

¶J

1, 3, 10-11, at 7, 9

272.
Richard Vann, Interpretation of Tax Treaties in New Holland 7 (Sydney Law Sch. Legal
Studies Research, Paper No. 10/21, 2010).

273. See, e.g., Taisei Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 1o4 T.C. 535, 550 (1995); see also Itai
Grinberg, Breaking BEPS: The New International Tax Diplomacy, CEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 38) (on file with author).
274.

Grinberg, supra note 273 (manuscript at 42 n.19 4 ) (citation omitted).

275.

See, e.g., Pekar v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 158, 162-64 (1999).
276.
But seeTownsend, supranote 8, at 297-98 (noting that the court failed to cite U.K. cases
interpreting language from parallel treaties that were put forth by amici).
277.
See Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty
Interpretationover Time and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 443,
459-60 (2010) (discussing "subsequent practice" as encompassing acts by all of the treaty parties
or acquiescence by the non-engaging party). For instance, in Stuart, the Court observed that the
IRS had complied with information requests from Canadian authorities without regard to the

stage of the criminal proceeding. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989).
278.

Bederman, supranote 7, at 994.
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OBJECTIONS

Interaction with International Law

For obvious reasons, it is important that an interpretive methodology not
lie in derogation of international law. The use of extrinsic sources, particularly
unilateral ones, may be controversial from the perspective of international law
but is accepted in some circumstances by article 32 of the Vienna Convention,
which provides that courts look to supplemental materials to either:
(i) confirm the meaning resulting from article 3 1; or (2) arrive at a meaning
in the face of "ambiguous or obscure" text or "absurd or unreasonable" results
from a literal application.279 Of course, article 32 begs the question of the
threshold level of ambiguity or absurdity. It is quite difficult and even
counterproductive to determine a threshold that is applicable to all cases.
Nonetheless, because of the highly technical nature of the international tax
system that causes frequent ambiguity and often results in special meanings,
as well as the regularity of abusive transactions that will likely lead to absurd
results, courts should invoke the exceptions to the Vienna Convention
relatively frequently.
Another hurdle to the pragmatic approach in treaty interpretation is that
the drafters of the Vienna Convention rejected a similar proposal by Professor
McDougal, who argued for a less textual interpretive approach than what was
eventually adopted. Although this approach would have allowed more
flexibility in application and sources consulted, much like my own, the New
Haven School of treaty interpretation, of which McDougal was a founder, also
heavily focused on world policy norms, prescribing furtherance of "value
distribution and the fundamental institutions that are compatible with the
preferred system of public order."28 0 In this respect, the New Haven School's
approach is quite different from the one I suggest.
Additionally, although commentators sometimes contend that the
United States' reliance on extrinsic sources deviates from the predominant
interpretive approach with regard to tax treaties abroad,2 8 , other countries
consistently diverge from the textualist approach adopted by the Vienna
Convention in the tax treaty context. For instance, courts in New Zealand and

279. Vienna Convention, supra note i, art. 32. Some have argued that supplementary
materials exclude unilateral materials. See Bederman, supra note 7, at 973; Vogel & Prokisch,

supra note 228, at 74. These arguments are based on the fact that article 32 mentions only
negotiating materials and the circumstances of the treaty's conclusion. The plain language of
article 32, however, uses these examples as illustrative rather than exhaustive: "Recourse may be
had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and
the circumstances of its conclusion . . .. " Vienna Convention, supra note i, art. 32.
MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND
280.
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 40-41 (1994).
281.
SeeROHATGI, supranote 220, at 3l.
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Canada have cited to unilateral materials, such as U.S. Technical Explanations
and Senate reports.=22 Numerous countries, such as Australia, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom rely upon the OECD commentaries. t s
Indeed, the very existence of the OECD commentaries reflects international
rejection of a strictly textualist based approach to tax treaty interpretation.
Although some countries are more formalist than othersS24 the
particular features of tax treaties and the realities of the international tax
system have created substantial deviation away from the Vienna Convention.
Additionally, the OECD's embrace of domestic anti-abuse rules and
ambulatory interpretation indicates a less formalist trajectory for tax treaty
interpretation in the broader international community. Strict adherence to a
plain meaning approach would thus lie in derogation to trends in the
international community rather than bolstering international law.
2.

Double Taxation

It could also be argued that relying upon extrinsic sources in tax treaty
interpretation would produce double taxation due to conflicting
interpretations resulting from methodological flexibility and the many
sources that may be consulted. The plain meaning approach, however, does
not guarantee predictable, harmonious results. After all, the ordinary
meaning of a term is often far from clear, especially when different legal
cultures and languages are involved.28 5 Moreover, the extensive detail of the
OECD commentaries supplies clear answers to many interpretive questions,
thus providing more certainty and less variation than the plain meaning
approach in many cases.
Additionally, tax treaties are usually applied only by the source country,
leaving few instances where two countries are actually interpreting the same
term.2 86 Even when the residence country is also the interpreter, tax treaties

282.
PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 42-43
(2d ed. 1994).

283.

Id. at 28-29.

284.

See, e.g., id. at 27-28 (recounting a trio of cases in the United States, Germany, and

England expounding similar treaty provisions essentially upon intentionalist, purposivist, and
literalist grounds respectively).
285. In the domestic statutory interpretation context, there is also little consensus over the
meaning of ambiguity. See United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(containing any inquiry by then Circuit Court judge Scalia as to "how much ambiguousness
constitutes an ambiguity"). Further, what constitutes an absurd result such that departure from
the plain meaning is justified? See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, i 16 HARv. L. REV.
2387, 2392 (2003) (discussing the vagaries in applying the absurdity doctrine).
286. Boulez v. Commissioner, discussed earlier, is the classic counterexample where both the
residence and source countries are interpreting the same term in the treaty. Boulez v. Comm'r,
83 T.C. 584 (1984). There is to my knowledge, however, only one such case in the American case
law, indicating the rarity of this phenomenon.
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themselves have additional mechanisms, such as the mutual agreement
procedure and arbitration clauses, that attempt to resolve disputes resulting
in double taxation. These devices minimize the risk of double taxation that
any discordant interpretations may bring.
Moreover, the domestic laws of developed countries already provide
mechanisms, like the foreign tax credit and exemption of foreign source
income, that prevent double taxation. As far back as 1963, Elisabeth Owens
argued that "U.S. income tax treaties play a very marginal role in relieving
[since] the U.S. has unilaterally provided for the
double taxation ...
avoidance of double taxation."27 More than a decade ago, Tsilly Dagan
argued that, in fact, the domestic tools of nearly all countries eliminate double
taxation of business taxpayers and thus make obsolete the stated function of
tax treaties.288

3.

Planning Difficulties

Another objection to the use of extrinsic materials in tax treaty
interpretation is that taxpayer planning would be disrupted by unsettled
interpretations. For instance, the countries might arrive at different
interpretations depending on the sources they consult or the interpretive
methodology they adopt. This puts taxpayers in the position of navigating
between multiple interpretations.
These problems, along with the problem of double taxation, will occur
unless each country applies the identical interpretive methodology, a farfetched goal. Still, one could argue that if all nations adopted the plain
meaning approach set forth in the Vienna Convention, their interpretations
would be closer to harmonization. As previously mentioned, however, such an
approach does not promise a determinate meaning.289 This is especially true
in the tax treaty context. As one author has stated: "There can be few legal
documents, short of a national constitution, that cover more ground with
287. Elisabeth A. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double
Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 428,430 (1963).
288. See generally Dagan, supra note 194; see also JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND FOREIGN INCOME 1 55.2 (2000) ("[I]ncome

tax treaties can easily be taken at first inspection as measures designed to confer tax relief on
certain individuals or enterprises. In fact, that is rarely their function. Tax treaties are principally
concerned with the apportionment of tax revenues between the treasuries of the treaty
countries."); PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 178 ( 5 th rev. ed. 2005) (remarking on the unilateral means nations employ to alleviate
double taxation, using treaties to conform these measures "to the specifics of the tax relationships
between the two countries involved"); Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with
Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1763 (1995) (arguing that the domestic means for
avoiding double taxation has eliminated the benefits treaties provide to taxpayers, and instead
such treaties "intend[] to effect a roughly neutral exchange of tax revenues between the source
and residence countries").
289. Because tax treaties contain ambiguities, textualism does not necessarily provide a plain
meaning that would be known to all. See Smith, supra note 8, at 867.
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fewer sentences than a tax treaty. Where is a court to turn in the numerous
situations where the treaty will have no 'plain meaning'?"29o A plain meaning
approach would also lie in derogation of the wishes of treaty partners who
intentionally design tax treaties interstitially. Nor does the plain meaning rule
likely reflect the expectations of taxpayers, whose activities are carried out in
reliance upon robust extrinsic sources that support the treaty.
B.

HARMoNIzATIONDEVICES

For the reasons mentioned above,291 I am not particularly troubled by the

risks of double taxation and planning difficulties presented by a pragmatic
approach to interpretation. I do recognize, however, that if there are ways to
harmonize interpretations to reduce double taxation and unpredictable
results, then efforts should be made in that direction so long as they allow for
the flexible use of extrinsic sources in the interpretive process. To assist in this
endeavor, I have developed a set of harmonization devices that may serve to
guide interpreters to a more uniform approach in the interpretation of tax
treaties.
1.

A Loose Ordering of Sources

Ordering the available interpretive sources would ameliorate the critique
that incorporation of extrinsic materials leads to unpredictable results and
double taxation. Providing a positive account of the Court's use of
interpretive sources in domestic statutory interpretation cases, William
Eskridge and Philip Frickey developed the famous funnel of abstraction.9
Statutory text is, of course, the most concrete of available interpretive sources,
and current policy is the most abstract, with legislative history, purpose, and
statutory evolution in between (in order of abstraction). The more concrete
sources provide a more limited set of arguments than the more abstract.
Eskridge and Frickey argue that this funnel represents a rough hierarchy, with
a compelling textual argument winning over an equally compelling
purposivist argument.293 That being said, the interpreter is not strictly bound
by the hierarchy and will instead "move up and down" the funnel of
abstraction, "evaluating and comparing the different considerations
represented by each source of argumentation."-94 In addition to presenting
the model as a descriptive account of the Court's interpretive approach,
Eskridge and Frickey defend the funnel from a theoretical perspective.
Specifically, they argue that the insights of legal hermeneutics tell us that an
290.

Chip, supra note 255, at 331.

See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note io, at 353-54; see alsoWilliam N. Eskridge,Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1496-97 (1987) (prescribing an interpretive
"continuum" ranging from statutory text to "evolutive" context).
293. Eskridge & Frickey, supranote io, at 354.
Id.
294.
291.

292.
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interpreter draws upon an array of arguments and cannot avoid present-day
policies and principles.295
From a practical perspective, the funnel of abstraction has become a
useful blueprint for formulating and ordering interpretive arguments, as well
as for predicting the range of possible rationales and outcomes in a statutory
case. Extending this model to the tax treaty interpretation context may
similarly assist the judiciary and taxpayers in organizing their reasoning, thus
harmonizing treaty interpretations. The model I have created orders
commonly used interpretive sources from most concrete to most abstract. The
order of the sources roughly corresponds with their degree of bilateralness.
Sources that are clearly available and shared between treaty parties are most
concrete. Unilateral sources that represent policy norms or that are not
contemporaneous are the most abstract. Within each category, there are
subcategories, which I explain in the text. Additionally, the other treaty
partners' affirmative embrace or rejection of the interpretation set forth in
each source will either bolster or discredit its usefulness.
Like the original model, it is intended to be both descriptive and
normative. Although it provides a loose hierarchy of sources, it acknowledges
that the interpreter will test her interpretation of the statute against the
considerations presented at each level. Thus, although there is an order of
priority in the model, it is one that represents only the typical case. The
precise synthesis of sources would depend on the particular issue and facts at
hand. I have chosen bilateralness as a metric in order to give effect to the
parties' shared intent, a goal that is central to treaty interpretation, but the
flexibility inherent in the model recognizes that such an endeavor is unlikely
to produce certain results and may, under certain circumstances, be
overridden by other concerns.

295.

Id. at 360.
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Figure 1. A Practical Reasoning Model of Tax Treaty Interpretation296
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The treaty text is, of course, the most concrete inquiry. Under the Vienna
Convention, and in most U.S. tax treaty cases, the starting point is the treaty
language. The text is primary since it is international law and parties have
relied upon it. That being said, courts must be attuned to the special meaning
of terms, as opposed to the plain meaning, since the former is common in the
tax context. Other textual considerations, such as treaty structure, may enter
into this analysis. A treaty's direct incorporation of domestic law will be highly
instructive and should be thought of as part of the treaty's text. For instance,
when a treaty refers to the laws of the treaty state in defining residency, then
the local residency rules must be consulted. Additionally, when a treaty defers
to local law in the case of an undefined term, then local law must supply the
definition.
The model next considers materials that are closest to the treaty
process-bilateral agreements and negotiating materials, in order of
concreteness. Bilateral agreements may consist of: (1) contemporaneous
agreements as to the meaning of a treaty term or concept; or (2) subsequent
agreements by the competent authorities as to such meaning. The former may
include affirmative assent to Senate conditions. The latter might also include
the recent phenomena of joint technical explanations.297 Negotiating
materials, or travaux prdparatoires, are also included within this category.
Contemporaneous legislative and executive materials are in the next
category due to the essential involvement of the two branches in the treatymaking process. Senate conditions are the most notable and, under some

296.

This schematic is adapted from Eskridge's and Frickey's funnel of abstraction. Id. at 353.
For instance, Treasury conferred with Canada in drafting the technical explanation to
297.
the 2007 Protocol to the U.S.-Canada tax treaty. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OFTHE PROTOCOL
DONE AT CHELSEA ON SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 AMENDING THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND CANADA WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL DONE AT
WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 26, 198o, AS AMENDED BYTHE PROTOCOLS DONE ONJUNE 14, 1983,
MARCH 28, 1994, MARCH 17, 1995, AND JULY 29, 1997, at i (U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY 2007),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/tecanadao8.pdf.
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views, must be adhered to as a constitutional matter. Typically, the President
must put the other treaty country on notice of any such condition.29 8 Treasury
Technical Explanations, Joint Committee reports, and Senate Finance
Committee Reports are also sources that are visible to our treaty partners and
can assist in interpretation. Less useful are those types of materials that
traditionally receive less deference in the domestic context, such as hearings,
statements, or comments from executive officials. Similarly, the U.S. Model
Treaty explanation is rarely updated, and thus may not reflect current U.S.
negotiating positions, but it may nevertheless be useful in supplying meaning.
The OECD commentaries are also widely available to the international
community and should be highly influential in treaty interpretation.
Although contracting states do not directly adopt the commentaries, they
bind OECD countries that do not make reservations to them. The
commentaries also benefit from input by OECD countries. These
commentaries are ambulatory in nature; as discussed above, it is appropriate
to rely on recent interpretations so that treaties can reflect changing
economic and technological environments, as well as ward off taxpayer
abuse.299

The next level of the funnel prescribes attention to treaty purpose. The
academic literature has cast doubt upon statutory purpose as an interpretive
aid, questioning purposivism's underlying assumption that legislatures
produce reasonable, purposive results and that a single, public purpose can
be articulated.3- These concerns extend to the treaty context.so Also, as
discussed above, the stated purposes of tax treaties-the relief of double
taxation and avoidance of fiscal evasion-are not the only factors guiding
treaty-makers.so2 I therefore do not accept a wholesale "purposive" approach
to tax treaty interpretation as some commentators recommend.s3

298. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REIATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 314 cmt. b
(AM. LAW INsT. 1986).
See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
299.
See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note to, at 332-39 (criticizing purposivism); Cass R.
300.
Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,426-28 (1989) (same).
301. Specifically, under public choice theory, legislators dole out benefits to rent-seeking
interest groups, and the byproduct of these many compromises does not contain one public
purpose, but is instead an aggregation of various purposes. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supranote
so, at 335. Similar observations can be made in the treaty process, which is not impervious to
capture by interest groups. Indeed, a cynical view of tax treaties is that they "quietly bestow
benefits on multinationals that would not be obtainable in the regular political process."
Sheppard, supranote 170, at 828 (noting comments of Stuart Chessman).
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
302.
See Smith, supra note 8, at 858-63. My conclusions here are thus similar to those of
303.
Michael Livingston's in the domestic statutory context. Livingston rejects the claims of some
scholars that the underlying logic and structure of the Code justifies a purposivist approach.
Michael Livingston, PracticalReason, "Purposivism,"and the Interpretationof Tax Statutes, 51 TAx L.
REv. 677, 679 (1996). Accordingly, we both prescribe a practical reasoning approach to
interpretation rather than purposivism. Id. at 720-24.
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Nonetheless, concerns about double taxation and other treaty goals should
be a factor in the interpretive process, depending on the reliability of other
available sources.
The remaining two levels might be thought of as "dynamic," as it is
referred to in the literature.304 The evolution of the treaty will primarily be
the subsequent practices of the parties and its implementation by Congress,
the courts, and agencies. Domestic law is thus a large component of this
category. As mentioned, direct incorporation of domestic law is akin to a
treaty supplement, in which case its status is that of the text. Domestic law,
however, may also be consulted when the treaty employs ambiguous terms,
such as business profits discussed above.os The interpreter may also consult
case law and administrative materials that apply and interpret such concepts,
keeping in mind the aforementioned discussion of deference levels, with
minimal deference to materials published in connection with pending
cases.3o 6 Court decisions of the treaty partner, or even of other countries, may
be consulted, although practical barriers to doing so may exist, such as the
difficulty in obtaining and translating foreign materials. Finally, general policy
concerns, such as fairness, or tax policy concerns specific to the international
tax context 0 7 may also influence the judiciary's interpretation.
2.

Interpretive Presumptions

Interpretive presumptions in the form of substantive canons could also
be employed as harmonization devices. In this Subpart, I propose one such
presumption and discuss presumptions that have been recommended in the
literature. Note that, as interpretive presumptions, they should set up a
probable interpretive outcome that can be overcome through support for a
conflicting interpretation in other sources such as text, negotiating history,
and model treaty commentaries. They thus offer more interpretive guidance
than mere tiebreaker rules and less constraint upon the treaty drafters than
clear statement rules.sos

i.

Presumption Against Double Taxation

One way to ameliorate the problem of double taxation that is arguably
exacerbated by the incorporation of extrinsic materials is for courts to adopt
a presumption against interpretations that would create double taxation.
Such a presumption would also assist in the harmonization of treaty

&

See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1o.
304.
305. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 2 54-66 and accompanying text.
307. For instance, the NatWest court might have considered whether, from a tax policy
perspective, intracorporate lending transactions should be disregarded. See Reinhold
Harrington, supranote 178, at 195-96.

3o8. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISILATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 884 ( 4 th ed. 2007).
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interpretations across nations, therefore promoting predictability. There is
precedent for such an interpretive canon. Private international law recognizes
a principle of "common interpretation" in the interpretation of conflict of law
rules, as well as in the areas of commercial paper and international sales,
among others.o9 Additionally, implicit within articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention is the principle that parties endeavor to apply the treaty
consistently.31o
Indeed, some courts apply a rule similar to common interpretation in the
context of tax treaties. Canadian courts have cited U.S. interpretations as
influential, emphasizing that inconsistencies between U.S. and Canadian
decisions might produce double taxation.3" Likewise, the U.S. courts have
noted the interpretation of another country and the desirability to avoid
double taxation in forming their own interpretation.12 Other foreign courts
have gone so far as to treat foreign decisions as binding precedent,3'3
although in my view such an approach would violate national sovereignty. An
interpretive presumption against double taxation would merely call upon
courts to consult foreign authority on the subject if reasonably available and,
if persuasive, interpret the treaty in harmony with such authority. Thus, this
presumption has particular application when a foreign court has directly
spoken on the issue or when a foreign nation has expressed its views
diplomatically or through an amicus brief.
ii.

InterpretingTax Treaties Liberally

Another interpretive presumption prescribes that courts interpret tax
treaties liberally.3'4 This canon applies generally to treaty interpretation and
was first embraced by the Court in Geofroy v. Riggs, which stated that
[i]t is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that
they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent
intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between
them.

...

[W]lords are to be taken in their ordinary meaning . .. and

not in any artificial or special sense impressed upon them by local
law .... [W] here a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive
of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to
them, the latter is to be preferred.s's

310.

VOGEL ET AL., supra note 152, at 29.
Id.

311.

See, e.g., Canadian Pac. Ltd. v. The Queen, [1976] 3o D.T.C. 6120, 6135 (F.C.T.D.).

312.

See, e.g., Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200, 207-08 ( 9 th Cir. 1962).
See, e.g., Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan Am. Airways Inc., [1969] 1 QB 616.

309.

313.
314.

See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368 (1989); Bacardi Corp. of Am. v.

Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940); United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 14 (2d
Cir. 1975); N.W. Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Comm'r, 107 T.C. 363, 378 (1996).
315.

Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271-72 (18go).
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Thus, the canon has been employed largely to promote private rights
bestowed by treatiess' 6 although it has fallen out of favor with the Court in
the last several decades.s'7
Liberal interpretation is a poor fit in the tax treaty context. For one,
specialized meanings in the tax context abound, as do express and implicit
references to domestic law, thus constraining the interpreters. Liberal
interpretation may also be in tension with another international law
principle-that an agreement be undertaken in good faith.3' 8 The
requirement of good faith may be especially relevant in the context of tax
abuse. Applying the two concepts may devolve into dueling purposes,
producing outcomes that would catch treaty partners off-guard.3'9 Liberal
interpretation might also lend itself to double non-taxation by the treaty
20
parties, a phenomena of increasing concern.3
A liberal presumption is also at odds with the notion of sovereignty. To
sure,
this is the case with all treaties and I do not mean to return to a world
be
where sovereignty concerns required clear expression of all treaty
obligations.321 Yet the tension is especially apparent in the tax context. Given
the tie between taxation and the fisc,322 the relinquishing of taxing
jurisdiction is not something that a sovereign would likely do implicitly or
lightly.323 More importantly, a liberal presumption ignores the view that tax
treaties primarily exist not to benefit taxpayers but to "sort out the interfacing
aspects of [the treaty partners'] tax systems and to cede jurisdiction from the
source nation to the taxpayer's residence nation when the taxpayer's contacts

316. This is the most common view of the canon, although newer iterations of the canon
suggest that liberal construction simply instructs courts to interpret provisions using various
interpretive aids. See also Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith, supra note 7, at 1916-19. There is
also case law that emphasizes protection of the rights of the sovereign through narrow treaty
construction. See Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F. 3 d 634, 639 ( 5 th Cir. 1994)
(" [C]ourts should interpret treaty provisions narrowly-for fear of waiving sovereign rights that
the government or people of the State never intended to cede."); Stuart S. Malawer, Maryland
and Supreme Court Treaty Interpretation:Paradoxand Dilemma, 2 U. BALT. L. REV. 35,46 (1972).
See Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith, supra note 7, at 1915-16.
317.
318. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 26 ("Every treaty ... must be performed by
[the parties] in good faith."); Bederman, supra note 7, at 968-69 (discussing the tension between
good faith and liberal interpretation).
Bederman, supra note 7, at 969-70.
See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX PEV. 699, 701--06 (2011).
See Rogoff, supra note 7, at 616-46 (discussing the restrictive approach to treaty
321.
interpretation based on sovereignty concerns and its subsequent fall from relevance).
See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
322.
323. See Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1045, 1072 (1992) ("[A]n
understanding of a position which forms the basis for a negotiated international agreement
cannot be arrived at 'tacitly,' but must be achieved consciously and deliberately by both parties.");
see alsoTownsend, supranote 8, at 286 (concluding that implicit treaty benefits are inappropriate
in the tax context essentially for sovereignty-related reasons).
319.

320.

1442

IOWA LAWREVIEW

1VOl- 101:1387

with the source nation are minimal."324 Although my recommendation for the
presumption against double taxation is similar to the liberal presumption rule
because it results in benefitting taxpayers, it would do so in narrower
circumstances-when there is direct foreign law on point. A presumption
against double taxation is a softer version of the liberal presumption rule and
more successfully navigates between the interests of sovereignty and
harmonization.
iii. Presumptionin Favor of Source/Residence Country
Commentators have urged the adoption of other possible presumptions
to encourage harmonization. John F. Avery Jones, for instance, has argued
that when a treaty uses legal terms that comprise the substantive law of both
treaty partners, the source country's rules should apply.325 Similarly, Russell
Osgood has contended that ambiguities be resolved in favor of the source
country since "the basic message of tax treaties is to permit source country
taxation."2 6 Others, however, view the OECD and U.S. Model Treaties as
confirming "taxation in the state of residence is the rule, while taxation in the
country of source is the exception."27 There is truth in both of these
descriptions. For instance, one could point to the fact that the source country
retains its right to tax business profits under tax treaties as support for the
view that the source country has primary jurisdiction to tax active income.
Indeed, this has been the consensus view for nearly too years.3zs Nonetheless,
treaties also lower or eliminate the withholding taxes imposed by the source
country on investment income, thus supporting the understanding that tax
treaties benefit residence countries, which are able to tax the investment
income on a residual basis.329
From a normative perspective, there are also arguments on both sides as
to which country has the primary right to tax income. T.S. Adams, one of the
founders of our international system of taxation, argued that the source

Osgood, supra note 8, at 294; see also BAKER, supra note 283, at 21 ("[Dlouble taxation
324.
agreements have a purpose substantially differing from that of normal political or economic
treaties because they are intended to reconcile two national fiscal legislations and to avoid the
simultaneous taxation in both countries." (citation omitted)); supra notes 288-89 and
accompanying text.
325.
326.

SeeAvery Jones et al., supranote 9, at 48; Osgood, supra note 8, at 297.
Osgood, supra note 8, at 297. The ALI Federal Income Tax Project supports this view.

FEDERAL INCOME TAx PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II,
at 62 (AM. LAW INST. 1992) (prescribing tiebreaker rule in favor of the source country).

327. Vogel, supra note g, at 65. Specifically, Vogel points to article 21 of the OECD Model
Treaty, in which items of income not dealt with specifically by the treaty are taxable only by the
state of residence. Id. at n.343.
328. Edward D. Kleinbard, Why Corporate Tax Reform Can Happen, TAX NOTES, Apr. 6, 2015,
at 91, 95See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 194.
329.
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country had primary jurisdiction to tax.33o Under his view, source countries
had the right to tax income since this was analogous to a sovereign's claim
over natural resources and because foreigners doing business within a nation
used its resources.33' Edwin R.A. Seligman, a contemporary and intellectual
opponent of Adams, argued that the residence country should receive
exclusive power to tax since fairness concerns demand that ability-to-pay
principles be based on worldwide income.332
A more nuanced canon might resolve ambiguities with regard to active
business income in favor of the source country and those with regard to
passive income unrelated to a taxpayer's business in favor of the residence
country. This would be in keeping with Adams' view that a type of benefits
theory justifies the source country's jurisdiction to tax, a view that is not as
convincing when applied to investment income because such income is often
located in a source country purely for tax-motivated reasons. While still
respecting the source country's primary jurisdiction, this rule would limit it
primarily to situations in which there is meaningful contact with the source
state. It would also correspond with the dual nature of tax treaties, which
benefits both source and residence countries depending on the type of
income.
iv.

The Last in Time Rule and the Charming Betsy Canon

Another way to encourage harmonization acrossjurisdictions is to reduce
the number of treaty overrides. To achieve this, one might be tempted to join
those American scholars who have condemned the aforementioned last in
time rule.sss Doing so, however, would present particular problems in the tax
treaty context. I have previously written about the constitutional tension
between the Treaty Clause, which contemplates a role only for the Senate and
the Executive in treaty-making, and the Origination Clause, which mandates
that revenue-raising laws originate in the House of Representatives.334 The
House's ability to override legislation likely contributes to the current stability
over this precarious arrangement. Taking that power away from the House
would not only compound the constitutional problems, it would likely result
in the House reasserting its prerogative in this area through more direct
means.3as Moreover, undoing the last in time rule would, in the tax context,

330.

See Graetz, supra note

331.

Id.

192, at 298.

Id. at 297.
333. See Louis Henkin, Treaties in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 10 MICH.J. INT'L L. 406,425-26
(1989); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power. Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071, 1o96 (1985).
334. See Kysar, supra note 28, at 7.
335. For instance, prior to the advent of the modern tax treaty, the House used to regularly
defend its right to participate in treaties involving tax revenues. Id. at 45. In fact, trade treaties
take the form of congressional-executive agreements and, as such, are approved only with House
332.
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require both judicial and legislative participation since the rule has been
codified in the Code.ss 6

Still, the last in time rule is not without limits. For instance, there is some
authority for requiring legislative intent to override before abrogating a
treaty.37 More importantly, a longstanding rule of interpretation,

the

CharmingBetsy canon,ss8 in which courts construe statutes in a way that does
not conflict with international law, softens the harshness of the last in time
rule. The canon is an important piece of the puzzling U.S. relationship with
international law,s39 and its regular deployment in the tax treaty area could

potentially reduce the number of treaty overrides that occur.340 There is
authority to apply the canon forcefully in this context because Congress has
affirmatively approved of its usage with regard to tax treaties.341
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article argues that a differentiated approach to treaty interpretation
is merited based on objective characteristics shared within a treaty category.
Specifically, the completeness of a treaty informs whether extrinsic materials

participation. Scholars have speculated that the Origination Clause is one driver behind this
development. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, i o8 HARv. L. REV. 799,
923 (1995); see also Halpern, supra note 33, at 3-4 (suggesting that the last in time rule functions
to alleviate the tension created by the incongruity between the Treaty Clause and the Origination
Clause). An interesting question arises in the tax context because, in codifying the last in time
rule with respect to tax treaties, the Senate indicated that the rule should apply without regard
to whether Congress expressed an intent to override the treaty. S. REP. No. 100-445, at 326
(1988). Since the rule is a constitutional interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, it is unclear
whether the Court would give effect to the Senate's interpretation in the tax treaty context. See
Anthony Infanti, Domestic Law and Tax Treaties: The United States, TAx NETWORK (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://tax.network/ainfanti/domestic-law-and-tax-treaties-the-united-states.
336. See supranotes 32-33 and accompanying text.
337. If the later enacted, conflicting statutory language is clear, then it overrides the treaty.
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 170 (D.D.C. 2002). If, however, such
language is ambiguous, courts inquire into Congress' intent with respect to the override before
giving priority to the statute. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984) (holding that legislative silence was insufficient in establishing a treaty override).
338. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
339. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and the Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 482 (1998).
340. Traditionally, U.S. courts have extended the CharmingBetsy canon to treaties. See, e.g.,
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (stating that treaties are to be construed in
accordance with international law); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S- 407,419-20,429 (1886)
(interpreting a treaty as to not conflict with preexisting obligations under international law).
Recent cases, however, suggest that this presumption is softening. Criddle, supra note 7, at 456
(citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), and United States v. Lui Kin-Hong,
1o F. 3 d 103 (1st Cir. 1997), as examples of cases where the court rejects a treaty interpretation
that would comport with international law).
341. In amending sections 894(a) and 7852(d) to codify the last in time rule, legislative
history indicates that Congress did not intend to override the presumption of harmony between
treaties and statutes. S. REP. No. 100-445, at 321 (1988).
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should be heavily relied upon. Tax treaties are skeletal in nature and the
reality of the international taxing system requires them to be so. Accordingly,
they mandate a fluid interpretive methodology that encompasses many actors
and sources, in a sense, their flesh and blood. The risk of double taxation that
such an approach entails is overstated and can be minimized through
harmonization devices. In contrast, a plain meaning approach to tax treaty
interpretation carries consequences: unintentional encroachment upon the
sovereign's domestic tax system, policy ossification in a rapidly changing
global economy, and abusive transactions that reduce the effective tax rate to
zero. These are all predictable and serious dangers. The use of a pragmatic
approach to tax treaty interpretation diminishes these risks.
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